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ABSTRACT 
 
Drug development in the United States is a lengthy and expensive endeavor.  It is estimated that average 
development times range from eleven to fifteen years and exceed costs of one billion dollars.  The 
development pathway includes basic scientific discovery, pre-clinical testing in animals, clinical 
development in humans, and an application process.  The Food and Drug Administration is responsible 
for the oversight and approval of drugs going through this process. 
 
Numerous financial and economic studies have been conducted that show the benefits to accelerating the 
drug development process.  In 1992, the United States Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee 
Act I, which mandated faster response times from the FDA in return for user fee payments to the FDA by 
the drug developing companies.  Data on approval times for new drugs indicate that this process was 
indeed shortened.  In contrast, the average drug development process prior to the filing of an application 
has been increasing in cost and time.   
 
The first purpose of this research is to quantify the benefits of accelerated new drug application review 
time under the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts I and II.  The second purpose of the research is to 
investigate what industry and the FDA can do together to reduce the development process time between 
the IND and NDA without compromising patient safety and welfare, specifically the Phase II, Phase III, 
and NDA components. 
 
The research indicates that PDUFA has improved approval times in a statistically significant way.  
Furthermore, the financial and social benefits as measured using net present value have far exceeded the 
PDUFA costs.  Quantitative and qualitative surveys of fifty individuals in large pharmaceutical and 
biotech companies resulted in the identification of several significant opportunities and useful suggestions 
for reducing development times in Phase II, Phase III, and the NDA.   
 
Specifically, company interviewees indicated that they were willing to pay additional monies for 
increased interaction and communication with the FDA from Phase II through the NDA in hopes of 
reducing information asymmetry and increasing information transparency.  Other recommendations 
included a mandatory audit and review of a sample of NDAs post approval to identify best practices, 
implementation of metrics and performance tracking during clinical phases, and implementation of 
consistent project management and communication standards across therapeutic divisions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
Section 1.01 Motivation and Utility of Research 
The process of drug development and drug approval in the United States has received an 
unprecedented level of attention during the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004.  With public 
approval perceptions of drug companies at a low and the threat of drug importation from Canada 
and other countries, companies engaged in drug development, manufacturing, and marketing are 
scrambling to improve their reputation and justify the costs of their therapeutics.  Finally, the 
skyrocketing costs of drug development and the decreasing output of new molecular entities 
(NMEs) are of great concern to private and public health officials in the United States.   
 
In an attempt to address public health concerns in the early 1990’s, the United States Congress 
enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act I (PDUFA I) with the goal of reducing the time 
needed to approve an NME.  In several published studies, data indicate that new drug application 
(NDA) times1, on average, decreased considerably in the mid and late 1990’s during PDUFA.  In 
contrast, great strides have not been made in reducing the clinical development time and cost for 
NMEs.  The investigational new drug (IND) filing to NDA time period accounts for over 80% of 
the time and 90% of the cost of overall drug development.  There are a myriad number of 
reasons for this, which include but are not limited to increasing safety requirements, difficulty of 
patient recruitment for clinical trials, incomplete understanding of novel drug mechanisms and 
targets, and inefficient use of information gathering technologies such as genomics.  Given the 
burgeoning time and cost of the IND to NDA process, it is imperative that the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and industry together address the issues of clinical development. 
 
The motivation for this research stems from the apparent success that PDUFA has had on 
reducing new drug approval times.  While several studies indicate that PDUFA has been 
successful in reducing NDA times, no studies of which I am aware have quantified the benefit.  
Assuming that PDUFA has conferred great benefits to industry and society, legislating better 
performance and accountability from the agency during clinical development might increase the 
efficiency of the clinical development process.  Thus, the focus of this research is twofold.  First, 
the research attempts to quantify the benefit of PDUFA I and PDUFA II to the industry and to 
the public.  Second, the research attempts to identify some of the critical areas and opportunities 
for improvement within the IND to NDA process.  This thesis will address specifically the 
benefits of PDUFA in the areas of cardiovascular and central nervous system (CNS) drugs.  In 
regards to the IND to NDA process, this thesis will report the findings for parts of Phase II, 
Phase III, and the NDA periods.   
 
This thesis is only one segment of the entire research project.  It is my intent, in collaboration 
with Professor Ernst Berndt and Dr. Matthew Strobeck, to publish journal articles and a white 
paper that summarizes the collective research that was conducted on this project from August 
2003 through May 2004.  
 
1 New Drug Applications (NDA) and Biological Licensing Applications (BLA) are interchangeable in the context of 
this thesis.  Similarly the term “drug” can be interpreted broadly as new molecular entities. 
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At the time of the writing of this thesis, fifty industry individuals at seventeen companies (seven 
pharmaceutical, seven biotech, and three contract research organizations) have been interviewed 
using quantitative and qualitative surveys; however, formal interviews with FDA officials have 
not yet taken place.  Interviews with several division directors and FDA staff have been 
scheduled and will be included in future articles.  All interviewees were assured of 
confidentiality and anonymity as discussed in Chapter 3: Methods – Drug Development Surveys.   
 
My aim is to provide a balanced and objective approach to this research.  Thus, I advise the 
reader to review future publications related to this research by Berndt, Strobeck, and Gottschalk. 
Section 1.02 Overview of Drug Development Time and Costs 
The drug development process consists of the well-documented process of basic discovery 
through new drug approval.  The process consists of pre-clinical and clinical development.  This 
process is shown in Figure 1-1 and described below.  The pre-clinical portion of development 
begins with basic discovery and research and extends through animal testing.  Upon filing of an 
IND and subsequent approval, the drug is considered to have moved into the clinical 
development process. 
 
The early portions of pre-clinical development consist of scientific experiments and validation of 
principles within academic, government, or industry labs.  These experiments are usually done in 
vitro.  Upon identification of a lead compound or set of compounds, animal testing is conducted.  
Compounds and intellectual property developed outside of a company is in-licensed.  Upon 
accumulation of adequate animal safety and efficacy data, the developing company, known as 
the sponsor, files an IND with the FDA to seek approval to move forward into experimentation 
in human subjects. 
 
Upon approval of an IND application, a sponsor can initiate clinical development in humans, 
which consists of Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III clinical trials.  Phase I clinical trials are 
designed mainly to test the preliminary safety of the drug in humans through the generation of 
pharmacokinetic data.  Pharmacokinetic data consists of absorption, distribution, metabolism, 
and excretion of the drug.  In general, this phase consists of a small group of healthy, paid 
volunteers ranging from twenty to one hundred patients.  Phase I clinical trials last several 
months.  Phase II clinical trials assess effectiveness and continue to monitor safety.  The number 
of patients involved in this phase range from a few dozen to several hundred.  Phase II trials can 
be several months to a few years long.  Phase III clinical trials are also known as pivotal clinical 
trials.  These trials are designed to assess efficacy in a statistically significant manner while 
continuing to monitor safety.  Final formulations and doses of the drug are assessed as well.  
Phase III trials can range from a few hundred to several thousand participants depending on the 
therapeutic area.2
 
 
2 US Food and Drug Administration.  Testing Drugs in Humans.  US Food and Drug Administration [online](cited 
27 Apr 2004) < http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/testchrt.html > (2004). 
There is an element of risk of NME failure associated with each phase of drug development.  
This probability of the NME moving forward from one phase of development to the next varies 
based on therapeutic area and several other drug and firm specific factors.  The probabilities 
indicated in Figure 1-1 are used for illustrative purposes.  When multiplied to achieve a 
cumulative probability, the chance of a drug making it from pre-clinical to approval is about 8% 
or for every thirteen drugs that is a serious candidate in pre-clinical, only one drug will make it to 
market.  Upon reaching the market, a drug may have only a decade or so remaining before its 
patent expires, not to mention significant competition from other therapeutics. 
 
Figure 1-1:  Drug Development Timeline3
IND
Phase I
Pre-Clinical
Phase II
Phase III
Clinical Approval
Safety
Safety
Dosing
Efficacy
Safety
Efficacy
Side Effects
Toxicology
5 to 11 yrs
Market
11 to 14 yrs0.5 to 2 yrs1 to 5 yrs
Market / Phase 
IV
NDA
40% 75% 48% 64% 90%
 
 
The drug development previously described tends to be lengthy and expensive.  Studies by Dr. 
Joseph Dimasi and collaborators at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development suggest 
that the cost of current drug development exceed $800 million and takes over ten years from 
basic discovery to market approval.4  According to a manager at a biotech company in 
Cambridge, MA, this cost estimation is actually conservative; the estimates that his company 
spends in excess of one billion dollars to get a drug to market.5  Additionally, a recent study by 
the consulting firm Bain & Company Inc. estimates that costs per successful drug launch may 
actually be closer to $1.7 billion.6   
 
In a study focusing on improving the productivity of drug development, Dimasi shows 
empirically that increasing the probability of success (Phase I to Market) from 21.5% to 33% 
                                                 
3 Mathieu, M.P., ed. “Development Pipeline Attrition.”  PAREXEL’s Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical Sourcebook 
2003/2004, 2003, p. 184. 
4 Dimasi, Joseph A., Hansen, Ronald W., Grabowski, Henry G.  “The Price of Innovation:  New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs.”  Journal of Health Economics, 2003;22:151-185. 
5 Lecture to Professor Fiona Murray’s MIT Sloan Management class 15.968 Building a Biomedical Business by Bill 
Anderson, VP Business Planning, Biogen Idec, Inc., December 3, 2003. 
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6 Gilbert, Jim, et al. “Rebuilding Big Pharma’s Business Model.”  In Vivo, 2003;21(10). 
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could reduce capitalized cost per approved drug by $242 million.  In comparison, a 50% 
reduction across all clinical phases lowers drug development costs per drug by $235 million.7   
 
Of the drugs that make it to market, which is estimated to be only 22% of all drugs that enter 
clinical development, a limited number recoup their R&D costs.8  In their analysis of returns on 
R&D for new drugs introduced into the market in the early 1990s,  Grabowski, Vernon, and 
Dimasi find that the distribution of returns is very skewed.  The top decile of new drugs accounts 
for over 50% of present value returns.  The second and third deciles contribute an additional 
30%.  The research study indicates that roughly one-third of new drugs have a present value that 
exceeds the average R&D costs.9   
 
The implication of the skewed returns and huge development costs is that companies continually 
seek to develop blockbusters, drugs with annual sales in excess of one billion dollars.  This is not 
a sustainable model for drug development given the current development paradigm. 
  
The trend over the last decade has been an increase in development costs with no significant 
reduction in time from IND filing to NDA.  In contrast, the time for drug approval, NDA to FDA 
market approval, has decreased substantially in the 1990’s.10,11 The decrease has been attributed 
in part to the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts, which have legislated pre-defined response times 
from the FDA in exchange for user fees paid by the companies sponsoring an NDA. 
 
While the industry and the public have appreciated the improvement in NDA approval times, the 
overall process of drug development remains lengthy and expensive, with estimates that the costs 
will continue to increase well above inflation rates.  Indeed, significant research has been 
devoted to expounding on the costs of the FDA-imposed process and to describing the failures of 
drugs in the development process.  The former FDA commissioner Dr. Mark McClellan, who 
recently left the FDA to head the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services, has taken issue 
with the process.  In an August 21, 2003 article in the Economist, Dr. McClellan “sees 
inefficiencies in the approval process that he wants to cure.”12   
 
In a study of the net benefits of the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Sam 
Peltzman argued that the new efficacy and safety requirements quadrupled costs and doubled the 
time for innovative therapeutics to make it to market.  Professor Peltzman essentially argues that  
there has been little benefit to consumers from the 1962 amendment and suggests that consumers 
                                                 
7 Dimasi, Joseph A.  “The Value of Improving the Productivity of the Drug Development Process.”  
Pharmacoeconomics.  2002;20(Suppl.3):1-10. 
8 Dimasi, Joseph A., Hansen, Ronald W., Grabowski, Henry G.  “The Price of Innovation:  New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs.”  Journal of Health Economics, 2003;22:151-185. 
9 Grabowski, H Vernon, et al.  “Returns on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions: The Cost 
and Value of New Medicines in an Era of Change”.  PharmacoEconomics, 2002;20(Suppl 3):11-29. 
10 Reichert, Janice M.  “Trend in Development and Approval Times for New Therapeutics in the United States.”  
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.  Sept. 2003;2. 
11 Kaitin, K., Cairns, C.  “The New Drug Approvals of 1999, 2000, and 2001:  Drug Development Trends a Decade 
after Passage of the Prescription User Fee Act of 1992.”  Drug Information Journal.  2003;7(1):357-371. 
12 “Food, Drugs, and Economics.”  Economist, Aug. 21, 2003. 
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might be better off without rigorous regulation.  I cannot agree with Peltzman’s suggestions due 
to evidence of corporate malfeasance and the high degree of information asymmetry between 
drug consumers, physicians, and the developing companies.13
 
In more recent publications, researchers suggest that the FDA “imposes more regulation of 
pharmaceuticals than is necessary and sufficient.”14  Comparisons are drawn between the FDA 
and the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA), which imply that 
the EMEA is more efficient in approving drugs on a lower budget.  Suggestions to improve the 
efficiency of drug regulation include regulation via non-profit independent agencies or third 
party review by accredited groups15.  While there may be some merit to some of these 
suggestions, the public and political hurdles are significant.  As evidenced by recent legislation 
including September 11, 2001 related acts and the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations for accounting, 
the United States political body is very reactive rather than proactive.   
Section 1.03 Brief Background and History of PDUFA 
The concept of payment of “user fees” by individuals or firms “using” a government regulatory 
body’s services is not entirely novel as evidenced by the precedent of the US Patent and 
Trademark office.  The development of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act permitted the FDA to 
collect fees from sponsors submitting an NME for NDA or biologic licensing application (BLA) 
review.  However, the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992 was controversial 
given the large amount of money at stake on drug approvals.  Since 1992 PDUFA has been 
renewed under the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (PDUFA II) and again under the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (PDUFA III).16
 
In exchange for the collected user fees, the FDA is legally obligated to “review and act on” 
NDA/BLA submissions.  According to the law: 
 
“‘review and act on’ is understood to mean the issuance of a complete action 
letter after the complete review of a filed complete application.  The action letter, 
if it is not an approval, will set forth in detail the specific deficiencies and, where 
appropriate, the actions necessary to place the application in condition for 
approval.”17
 
In essence, PDUFA mandates responses and action letters and not necessarily approvals.  The 
major PDUFA goals are described in Figure 1-2 below.  In the case of PDUFA I, II, and III, the 
FDA is obligated to deliver a complete review on 90% of priority applications within six months.  
For standard applications, the FDA was expected to review 90% of applications in twelve 
 
13 Peltzman, Sam.  Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation:  The 1962 Amendments.  Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974. 
14 Miller, Henry I.  “A Proposal for FDA Reform.”  Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.  Aug. 2002;1:642-648. 
15 Ibid. 
16 US Food and Drug Administration.  Prescription Drug User Fees – Overview.  US Food and Drug Administration.  
[online] (cited 27 April 2004) <http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/overview.html> (2004). 
17 US Food and Drug Administration.  PDUFA Reauthorization Performance Goals and Procedures.  US Food and 
Drug Administration.  [online] (cited 27 April 2004) <http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/PDUFAIIIGoals.html> (2004). 
months under PDUFA I; currently, the FDA is expected to review 90% of standard applications 
in ten months.  On the action date mandated by PDUFA, the FDA will issue one of three actions.  
The first action is a non-approvable letter indicating that the NDA/BLA has not satisfied the 
FDA’s standards for safety and/or efficacy.  The second type of letter is an “approvable” letter 
that indicates the NDA/BLA can be approved if certain deficiencies and questions are answered 
appropriately.  The final action can be the much desired approval letter that gives the sponsor 
company the right to market the drug to the public. 
 
According to Mary Olson, a researcher at Yale University, personnel at the FDA are greatly 
concerned with Type I errors.  A Type I error is the mistake of approving a drug that is truly 
unsafe and ineffective.  Type II errors which consist of not approving a safe and effective drug 
are not as important an issue to these individuals; however, the cost of delaying life saving drugs 
is equally as problematic as approving unsafe therapies.  The individuals, both within the FDA 
and among detractors of the large pharmaceutical companies, discount the pain and suffering of 
patients awaiting new drugs by focusing more on Type I errors.  The disproportionate focus on 
Type I errors is not surprising given the costs and punishment that can be meted out by Congress 
for these mistakes.  Thus, it is not surprising that the FDA has tended to move very slowly when 
approving drugs.  Due to the complexity of the drug laws, legislators have attempted to provide 
incentives for efficiency under the current process rather than attempting to amend the actual 
process.  PDUFA is such an example.18
Figure 1-2:  PDUFA Goals19
Goal PDUFA I PDUFA II PDUFA III
Complete review of priority original new drug and 
biologic applications and efficacy supplements
Complete review of standard original new drug and 
biologic applications and efficacy supplements
90% in 12 months
Complete review of manufacturing supplements 90% in 6 months
Complete review of resubmitted new drug and 
biologic applications
90% in 6 months
Complete review of resubmitted efficacy 
supplements
No Goal 90% in 6 months 90% of class 1 in 2 months and 
90% of class 2 in 6 months *
Discipline review letters for pre-submitted 
“Reviewable Units” of new drug and biologic 
applications
90% in 6 months *
Report of substantive deficiencies (or lack thereof) 90% within 14 days of filing date *
Respond to industry requests for meetings No Goal
Meet with industry within set times No Goal
Provide industry with meeting minutes No Goal
Communicate results of review of complete industry 
responses to FDA clinical holds
No Goal
Resolve major disputes appealed by industry No Goal
Complete review of special protocols No Goal
Electronic application receipt and review No Goal In place by the end of FY 
2002
Enhanced by the end of FY 2007
90% within 30 days
90% within 30 days
90% within 30 days
90% within 45 days
No Goal
No Goal
90% within 14 days
90% within 30, 60, or 75 days, depending on type of meeting
90% in 6 months
90% in 10 months
90% in 4 months if prior approval needed, 6 months otherwise
90% of class 1 in 2 months and 90% of class 2 in 6 months
 
                                                 
18 Olson, Mary K.  “Pharmaceutical Regulation.”  The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.  Ed. 
Peter Newman.  New York:  Stockton Press, 1998.  40-45. 
 
14 
19 US Food and Drug Administration.  PDUFA III Five-Year Plan.  US Food and Drug Administration.  [online] 
(cited 27 April 2004) <http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa3/2003plan/default.htm#update> (2004). 
 
15 
                                                
Section 1.04 Contract Research Organizations 
Contract research organizations (CROs) play an instrumental role in the development of many 
drugs.  CROs work with pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies of all sizes and across all 
phases of pre-clinical and clinical development.  The CROs often provide specific therapeutic 
experience, which supplements lack of knowledge within a company.  Very large CROs are 
often in a unique position, similar to the FDA in fact, in that they have experience across several 
drugs in a class and therapeutic area.20  In many cases, CROs offer the potential to reduce risk 
and reduce development time for smaller companies with less experience in drug development.  
Section 1.05 Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses were assessed empirically during the research on PDUFA and the drug 
development process.   
Hypothesis 1   
Industry believes that communication with the FDA is inadequate during late stage clinical 
studies. 
Hypothesis 2   
Ceteris paribus, PDUFA I and PDUFA II reduced NDA/BLA approval times relative to pre-
PDUFA time trends and had a net positive benefit to companies compared to PDUFA direct 
costs. 
Section 1.06 Roadmap 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into five additional chapters and an appendix.  In Chapter 
2: Methods – Drug Approval and PDUFA Analysis, the methods used to analyze NME data from 
1979 to 2002 are discussed.  I provide an explanation of the multivariate regression equation 
used to assess the significance of PDUFA and discusses how to calculate the net present value 
(benefit) of increased approval times.  In Chapter 3: Methods – Drug Development Surveys, I 
review the methods that were used to survey and to collect data from the pharmaceutical, 
biotech, and contract research organization companies.  
 
Chapter 4: Results – Drug Approval and PDUFA Analysis and Chapter 5: Results - Drug 
Development Surveys discuss the resulting analyses.  The data indicate that PDUFA had a 
statistically significant effect on NDA times and show that aggregate incremental benefits of 
PDUFA exceed the incremental direct costs.  Additionally, the data show that at the individual 
drug level, the net benefits will be highly skewed towards positive NPVs.  Data from the 
quantitative and qualitative survey indicate that industry believes that additional quality 
communication and interaction between the FDA and industry in Phase II, Phase III, and during 
the NDA is likely to reduce drug development times and make it more efficient.  Finally, in 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions, I attempt to bring all the information together and 
present several concrete suggestions for improving the efficiency of the drug development 
process.
 
20 Chapman, Ian.  “Evolving with Contemporary Contract Research.”  Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.  2003: 2; 
597. 
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Chapter 2: Methods – Drug Approval and PDUFA Analysis 
Section 2.01 Drug Database Construction 
The FDA provided a comprehensive list of NME’s approved from 1965-2003 (designated as 
“NME Data 65-03 Original”).  According to the provider of the data at the FDA, the list was 
error free and complete from the period of 1975 forward in regards to NDA approval length.  
The data fields provided by FDA are described in Figure A-1 in Appendix A:  PDUFA Data and 
Information. 
 
The FDA also provided an additional list that contained the NME name, NDA number, NDA 
sponsor, and a therapeutic class code.  The FDA also provided a separate file that contained the 
therapeutic class code and respective code description.  The therapeutic class code is a seven-
digit code with the first three digits indicating a major class code.  For example, major class code 
304 was indicated as therapeutic class “Metabolic/Endocrine III” and detailed class code 
3040300 indicated “Androgens/Anabolic Steroids.”   
 
In several instances, the major class code description between therapeutic classes was similar 
(i.e. “Metabolic/Endocrine I” vs. “Metabolic/Endocrine II”).  We created a super major class 
code and developed a mapping table to cross reference the major class code to the aggregated 
super major class code.  Finally, we added two therapeutic codes to account for biologics and 
pre-1979 data that did not contain a therapeutic class (B = BIOLOGIC; 0 = NO THERAPEUTIC 
AREA).  The code tables and mappings are provided in Figure A-2, Figure A-3, and Figure A-4 
in Appendix A:  PDUFA Data and Information. 
 
Using standard Microsoft Excel lookup functions, the “NME Data 65-03 Original” was enhanced 
to include the detailed seven-digit therapeutic class code and the corresponding major class code.  
Furthermore, the data fields were relabeled to adhere to a standard nomenclature (designated 
“NME MIT Data Reference”).   
 
For purposes of the PDUFA analysis, we were focused on NMEs submitted for approval from 
1979 through 2002.  The PDUFA I/II time period, as previously stated, extends from September 
1, 1992 to September 30, 2002.  In the case of one hundred and twenty-three NMEs during the 
1979 to 2002 period, FDA did not supply the corresponding therapeutic class.  For these drugs, a 
research assistant reviewed each drug in the 2003 Physician Desk Reference and entered a 
respective major class code.  The detailed class code was left blank.  Dr. Strobeck and I then 
reviewed the drug list and completed any further missing major therapeutic codes for this time 
period. 
 
Using the standard sort and filter functions in Microsoft Excel, the data were initially filtered to 
ensure that only drugs submitted for NDA approval between October 1, 1979 and September 30, 
2002 were included in the data set.21  Per requirements of the analysis, the data were sorted 
further according to therapeutic class and NDA date of submission as needed.  Great care was 
 
21 The government fiscal year is used.  It extends from October 1st of a year to September 30th of the following year. 
taken to ensure that sorted and filtered data sets were accurate in inclusion/exclusion of drugs 
based on the appropriate criteria.  The sort/filter and analysis functions were repeated and 
checked by the research team.  For purposes of conversion to months, days, or years, a month 
was defined as thirty days and a year was defined as 365.25 days in the calculations. 
Section 2.02 Statistical and Regression Calculations 
Basic statistics for desired date ranges and therapeutic classes were calculated using Microsoft 
Excel’s Data Analysis function “Descriptive Statistics.”  The statistical calculations include 
mean, standard error, median, mode, standard deviation, sample variance, kurtosis, skewness, 
range, minimum, maximum, sum, and count.  Appropriate graphs and tables were constructed in 
Microsoft Excel using the statistical data. 
 
Multivariate linear regressions were performed using Microsoft Excel’s Data Analysis function 
“Regression” on the set of NMEs submitted for NDA approval from 1979 to 2002 and on subsets 
of this data by date and therapeutic class.  The dependent variable in the regression equation was 
the natural log of a drug’s NDA approval time in months.  The explanatory variables used in the 
regression are described in Figure 2-1 below. 
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Figure 2-1:  Description of Variables Used in PDUFA Multivariate Regression 
on 
2 · TIMETREND +  β3  · 
β7 · 
The du class 
of interest (it become
value is set to zero. 
Variable Name Description
LNAPPMONTHS Natural log of NDA approval time in months - DEPENDENT VARIABLE
LNINDNDAMONTHS Natural log of IND to NDA time in months
TIMETREND A timetrend counter: 1 = 1979, 2 = 1980, …, 24 = 2002
PRIORITY Binary variable with 0 = Standard and 1 = Priority
TREND_PDUFA1 TIMETREND variable multiplied by PDUFA1 variable
TREND_PDUFA2 TIMETREND variable multiplied by PDUFA2 variable
ORPHAN Binary variable indicating orphan drug status: 0 = Non-orphan; 1 = Orphan Drug
NATION Binary variable indicating foreign NDA sponsor: 0 = Foreign; 1 = USA
DRG_CARDIO Dummy binary variable for cardiovascular class: 0 = Other Class; 1 = Cardio
DRG_ANTIINFECT Dummy binary variable for anti-infective class: 0 = Other Class; 1= Anti-infect.
DRG_NEOPLASTIC Dummy binary variable for neoplastic class: 0 = Other Class; 1 = Neoplastics
DRG_CNS Dummy binary variable for CNS class: 0 = Other Class; 1 = CNS
DRG_BIO Dummy binary variable for biologic class: 0 = Other Class; 1 = Biologic
DRG_AIDS Dummy binary variable for AIDS drugs: 0 = Other Class; 1 = AIDS drug
DRG_OTHER Dummy binary variable for all other drugs: 0 = ; 1 = All other classes
PDUFA1* Binary variable for NDA submitted during PDUFA I: 0 = Non-PDUFA I; 1 = PDUFA I
PDUFA2* Binary variable for NDA submitted during PDUFA II: 0 = Non-PDUFA II; 1 = PDUFA II
* Not used in regression equation directly
 
ined to be as follows: The regression equation was determ
Equation 2-1:  PDUFA Approval Time Generic Regression Equati
ln(approval time) = α + β1 · LNINDNDAMONTHS  + β
PRIORITY + β4· TREND_PDUFA1 + β5 · TREND_PDUFA2 + β6 · ORPHAN + 
NATION +  βx · DRG_[Therapeutic Area of Interest] + random disturbance term 
mmy variable DRG_[Therapeutic Area of Interest] changes based on the therapeutic 
s 1) and other therapeutic terms drop out of the equation as their binary 
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cts, 
e present value (PV) of sales in two scenarios.  The first case is the real 
world scenario using the actual FDA approval dates.  The second case, denoted as the 
d the approval date is predicted 
Section 2.03 Present Value Sales Calculations of PDUFA 
In order to measure the net present value (NPV) benefit/cost of the PDUFA I and PDUFA II a
we first calculated th
counterfactual, is the scenario where PDUFA does not exist an
based on the regression described in Equation 2-1.  The timeline for the approval process of a 
drug is represented in Figure 2-2 below. 
 
Figure 2-2: Timeline for Drug Approval under PDUFA 
PDUFA I 
Start
NDA Start 
Date
PDUFA NDA 
Approval Date
Market 
Launch Date
α i τ i µ i 15 year Sales Curve
α i denotes the time between the enactment of PDUFA I (September 1, 1992) and the NDA start date for a drug.
τ i denotes the time between the NDA start date and the approval date for a drug.
µ i denotes the time between approval date and market launch  
In the counterfactual case, the NDA approval time τi is shifted by δNDA , the difference between 
the predicted NDA approval time under PDUFA and the predicted counterfactual NDA approval 
time, both of which are calculated using Equation 2-1.  This difference is then added to the 
elapsed time between the NDA Start Date and the actual NDA Approval Date to determine the 
shift in time of approval in the counterfactual timeline as indicated by the bold arrows in Figure 
2-3 below.   
Figure 2-3:  Timeline for Drug Approval under Counterfactual 
PDUFA I 
Start
NDA Start 
Date
Counterfactual 
NDA Approval Date
Counterfactual 
Market Launch Date
α i τ i + δ NDAi µ i 15 year Sales Curve  
The PV of the difference between the PDUFA NDA case and the counterfactual NDA case, 
denoted as ∆Benefit, is then the difference between Equation 2-2 and Equation 2-3. 
Equation 2-2:  PV of Sales for PDUFA NDA 
∑ ∑
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Equation 2-3:  PV of Sales for Counterfactual NDA 
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r = discount rate 
CF = sales cash flow in a given year j 
αi, τi, µi,  are the time intervals as described in Figure 2-3 
 = a drug in a given therapeutic class and ranges to the nth drug in that class 
NDA approval time shift as predicted by regression equation 
Section
FDA, t e sales data 
for all d e sales 
data included the following channels according to the IMS information: independent pharmacies, 
out pharmacies, mail order pharmacies, 
e NME 
in Figure 2-4 below. 
igure 2-4:  Average NME Sales as Percentage of Peak Sales23
where: 
i
δNDA  = change in 
 2.04 Construction of NME Sales Curves 
hrough a third party agreement with IMS Health Inc., provided comprehensiv
rugs in the United States market from February 1998 to December of 2002.  Th
chain pharmacies, mass merchandisers with and with
food stores with pharmacies, non-federal hospitals, federal facilities, clinics, long-term care 
facilities, home health care, HMOs, miscellaneous channels (starting in 1999; prisons, 
universities, other).22
 
Given that many drugs were approved prior to 1998 and given that future sales beyond 2002 
were not available, complete fifteen-year sales curves were constructed using an averag
sales curve as shown 
F
Launch to Peak Sales:  Average for NMEs
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22 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration provided IMS sales data via a signed contract with Professor Berndt at 
the MIT Sloan School of Management. 
23 Mathieu, M.P., ed. “An Analysis of Launch-to-Peak Sales for NCEs”  PAREXEL’s Pharmaceutical R&D 
Statistical Sourcebook 2003/2004, 2003, p. 46. 
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For each NME, sales were annualized if the available sales data did not start in January of a 
given year.  Next, the first annualized year of sales available from the IMS data was correlated 
with the year after launch and the respective percentage of peak sales.  Dividing the annualized 
sales by the percentage of peak sales yielded the peak year sales.   
 
The peak sales were then deflated to 1992 dollars using the appropriate GDP deflator 
corresponding to the first annualized year of sales.  This was accomplished by first deflating or 
inflating sales as appropriate to 2000, the baseline year, and then deflating sales to 1992. 
The GDP deflator indices are shown Figure A-5:  GDP Deflation Table in the appendix.  The 
implication for deflation of sales to 1992 dollars means that the discount rates used for the time 
value of money calculations are all real discount rates.   
 
The complete projected sales curve was then calculated by multiplying the percentage sales of 
peak for each year times the calculated peak sales.  The complete sales curve was discounted as 
indicated in Equation 2-2 and Equation 2-3. 
Section 2.05 Present Value Cost Calculations of PDUFA  
The second component of the NPV calculation involved the calculation of costs of PDUFA over 
the lifetime of a NME.  PDUFA fees consist of application fees, establishment fees, and product 
The 
5 and forward were estimated 
ased on the compound annual growth rates (CAGR) from 1993 to 2004.  Given that the United 
 renewal 
n 
 to 
 
formation). 
ere charged during each year of sales.  One hundred 
each NME.  The establishment fee covers the 
age, roughly three drugs are 
                                                
fees.  FDA provided the PDUFA costs for these fees from 1993 to 2004 (See Figure A-6).24  
current fees for 2004 are a $573,500 application with clinical data fee, a $286,750 fee for 
applications with no clinical data, a $286,750 fee for supplements with clinical data, a $226,800 
establishment fee, and a $36,080 product fee.  PDUFA fees for 200
b
States Congress has renewed PDUFA every five years (1998, 2003) and given that the
year has a dramatic percentage increase relative to adjustments made in follow on years, 
significant increases were forecasted for 2008 and 2013.  The large percentage increases i
reauthorization years and subsequent minor increases between reauthorization were structured
yield a CAGR of 15%.  Similar to the sales curves, the actual PDUFA fees were deflated to 1992
dollars using the appropriate GDP deflator (See Figure A-7 in Appendix A: PDUFA Data and 
In
 
Novel NDA application fees were charged during the year of an NME’s NDA application to 
FDA.  Product fees and establishment fees w
percent of the establishment was allocated to 
manufacturing location and can cover multiple drugs.  On aver
manufactured per location; thus, a 100% allocation will overestimate the PDUFA costs for each 
drug.  This is therefore a conservative assumption. 
 
In order to account for additional prescription label submissions per NME, we made a 
conservative assumption of two supplemental NDAs submitted in the second year post market 
 
24 Provided by Tomas Philipson, Ph.D., Senior Economic Advisor to the Commissioner, Office of Policy & 
Planning, Office of the Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration 
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FDA Commissioner Analysis 
he effect of the presence or absence of a congressionally approved FDA commissioner on NDA 
 the 
 time 
A on which there was no commissioner.  A 
tal of six vacancy periods occurred from June 30, 1979 to November 14, 2002 (See Figure 2-5 
launch.  Supplemental NDAs do not increase the product fee or establishment fee already being 
paid by a company. 
Section 2.06 PDUFA NPV Calculations and Analysis 
The NPV for each PDUFA drug in a given therapeutic area of interest was calculated by 
subtracting the PDUFA fee costs from the ∆Benefit.  The NPV for each drug was then summed 
across all PDUFA drugs in a therapeutic area and also computed for each individual NDA/BLA. 
Section 2.07 
T
approval times was assessed using multivariate regression analysis.  First, for each NME, the 
overlap in time period of the vacancy of a commissioner was compared to the time period of the 
NDA.  A software application was written in Visual Basic for Applications to iterate through
commissioner vacancies and calculate the total ratio of commissioner vacancy time to NDA
period.  Given that an NDA could potentially span multiple vacancies, the software program 
accumulated the total number of days during the ND
to
below). 
Figure 2-5:  FDA Commissioner List and Vacancies25
Commissioner Start Term End Term
Harvey W. Wiley, M.D. 1/1/1907 3/15/1912
 /1921
Charles W. Crawford 6/1/1951 7/31/1954
12/27/1965
Carl L. Alsberg, M.D. 12/16/1912 7/15
Charles A. Browne 7/1/1924 6/30/1927
Walter G. Campbell 7/16/1921 6/30/1924
(two terms) 7/1/1927 4/30/1944
Paul B. Dunbar, Ph.D. 5/6/1944 5/31/1951
George P. Larrick 8/12/1954
James L. Goddard, M.D. 1/17/1966 7/1/1968
Herbert L. Ley, Jr., M.D. 7/1/1968 12/12/1969
Charles C. Edwards, M.D. 12/13/1969 3/15/1973
Alexander M. Schmidt, M.D. 7/20/1973 11/30/1976
Donald Kennedy, Ph.D. 4/4/1977 6/30/1979
Vacancy 6/30/1979 10/21/1979
Jere E. Goyan, Ph.D. 10/21/1979 1/20/1981
Vacancy 1/20/1981 4/13/1981
Arthur Hull Hayes, M.D. 4/13/1981 9/11/1983
Vacancy 9/11/1983 7/15/1984
Frank E. Young, M.D., Ph.D. 7/15/1984 12/17/1989
Vacancy 12/17/1989 11/7/1990
2/28/1997David A. Kessler, M.D. 11/8/1990
Vacancy 2/28/1997 11/30/1998
Jane E. Henney, M.D. 11/30/1998 1/19/2001
Vacancy 1/19/2001 11/14/2002
Mark B. McClellan, M.D., Ph.D. 11/14/2002 3/25/2004  
                                                 
25 US Food and Drug Administration. FDA Commissioners and Their Predecessors.  US Food and Drug 
Administration [online](cited 27 April 2004) <http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/comm1.html> (2004). 
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Multiple regressions, which include the variables listed in Figure 2-1, were run with the 
commissioner ratio variable.  The ratio was manipulated or used as the basis for other variables 
as described in the four methods in Figure 2-6. 
 
In the case of method 2, if the overlap ratio was equal to zero, it was not possible to take the 
natural log of the ratio.  Thus, the value was set to 0.001 to indicate no overlap.  An attempt to 
correct this manipulation was tried by using method three, which had the first variable, 
COMMISSX1 equal one when the ratio was zero.  The second variable, COMMISSX2, took on 
a zero value if the ratio were zero; otherwise it was equal to the natural log of the ratio. 
Figure 2-6:  Commissioner Vacancy Ratio Regression Variable  
Method Variable(s) Description
1 COMMISSIONER Ratio of commissioner absent days
2 LNCOMMISS Natural log of commissioner absent ratio
3 COMMISSX1 Binary variable indicating that if commissioner ratio is greater than 
zero then the value is zero, otherwise it is one.
COMMISSX2 If the commissioner ratio is zero than the value is zero, 
otherwise take the natural log of the ratio.
4 COMMISS_VAC Binary variable indicating a commissioner ratio greater than zero
Chapter 3: Methods – Drug Development Surveys 
Section 3.01 Assessment of Drug Development Issues 
To assess the issues associated with drug R&D and the FDA, I, in conjunction with a colleague 
and faculty member at the MIT Sloan School of Management, undertook a series of interviews 
with a total of seventeen industry companies that had locations in the United States.  The 
interviews were conducted from January 8th, 2004 to April 23rd, 2004.  In almost all cases, the 
companies had significant international offices.  The study population consisted of seven 
medium to large biotech/biopharmaceutical firms, seven very large pharmaceutical companies, 
and three contract research organizations (CROs).  All but one of the biotech/biopharmaceutical 
is a public company and has products on the market.  Figure 3-1 shows the breakdown of 
companies, interviewees by function, and interviewees by firm type. 
Figure 3-1:  Number of Individuals Interviewed by Company Type 
Company Type Individuals
Position
by Function Individuals
Position by
Firm Type Individuals
Biotech 1
Biotech 1 R&D Biotech
Biotech 2 Global Head 9 Global Head 8
Biotech 3 Executive VP 11 Executive VP 2
Biotech 3 Vice-President 13 Vice-President 9
Biotech 3 Director 5 Director 3
Biotech 9 R&D Subtotal 38 Biotech Subtotal 22
Biotech SubTotal 22
Regulatory Pharma
CRO 1 Global Head 3 Global Head 4
CRO 2 Executive VP 2 Executive VP 9
CRO 3 Vice-President 5 Vice-President 7
CRO SubTotal 6 Director 2 Director 2
Reg Subtotal 12 Pharma Subtotal 22
Pharmaceutical 1
Pharmaceutical 2 CROs
Pharmaceutical 2 EVP 2
Pharmaceutical 4 VP 2
Pharmaceutical 4 Director 2
Pharmaceutical 4 CRO Subtotal 6
Pharmaceutical 5
Pharma SubTotal 22
GRAND TOTAL 50 Grand Total 50 Grand Total 50  
 
We attempted to interview two or more individuals at each company.  With the exception of four 
companies, this was accomplished.  In most cases, we were able to interview one individual at a 
time.  There was only one case where more than two individuals were interviewed at one time.  
The total number of individuals interviewed at biotech companies was equal to the total number 
of individuals interviewed at pharmaceutical companies.  Six individuals at CROs were also 
interviewed.  A total of fifty individuals in the industry were interviewed.   
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We attempted to interview individuals who were at very senior level positions within their 
company and who had significant responsibilities for pre-clinical development, clinical 
development, regulatory oversight, or combinations thereof.  Of the fifty individuals interviewed, 
the vast majority of interviewees were at a Vice-President level in the company or higher.  
Figure 3-1 shows the breakdown of positions by function (R&D or regulatory) and by firm type 
(biotech-/pharmaceutical/CRO).  The specific percentage breakdown by position is given in 
Figure 3-2. 
Figure 3-2: Breakdown of Positions Interviewed at Biotechs, Pharmaceuticals, and CROs 
Percent of Total Individuals by Position
Global Head
24%
Executive 
VP
26%
Vice-
President
36%
Director
14%
 
We applied for and received approval from MIT’s Committee on the Use of Humans as 
Experimental Subjects (COUHES) to perform an in person survey of individuals involved in the 
R&D and regulatory processes (See Figure B-1:  Official COUHES Approval in the appendix).  
Interviewees were assured of confidentiality and anonymity to ensure candid responses.  Written 
notes of interviews and information were stored in a locked file cabinet by the supervising 
professor at MIT. 
Section 3.02 Questionnaire Development 
We developed a qualitative and quantitative questionnaire based on advice from faculty at the 
MIT Sloan School of Management, Harvard Medical School, and selected chapters on survey 
research methods from textbooks by Singleton26 and by Russell27. 
 
We first developed a pilot qualitative questionnaire with a very broad range of questions 
covering various topics from pre-clinical development through the value chain of drug 
development to Phase IV studies.  The pilot questionnaire was tested with volunteers at a large 
biotech company and a large pharmaceutical company.  The feedback from the interviewees 
coupled with the literature review and discussion with other academics helped us further refine 
the qualitative questionnaire and led to the development of the hypotheses.  
                                                 
26 Singleton, Royce Jr., et al.  Approaches to Social Research.  New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
24 
27 Bernard, H. Russell.  Social Research Methods:  Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.  3rd ed. California:  
Sage Publications Inc., 2000. 
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In addition to the qualitative questionnaire, we developed a quantitative questionnaire based on 
the pilot interviews.  The quantitative questionnaire required interviewees to rank the responses 
to various questions on a scale of one to five.  The questions and the four different ranking scales 
are presented in the full quantitative questionnaire located in Appendix B: Interview 
Questionnaires. 
Section 3.03 Interview Methodology 
Forty-four interviews were conducted in person.  Six interviews were conducted via 
teleconference or videoconference.  In advance of all the interviews, we sent a brief background 
memo and a letter from the FDA endorsing the research and assuring confidentiality to the 
interviewees.  Professor Berndt, Dr. Strobeck, or I led interviews as designated in a rotating 
schedule; all interviews were conducted consistently in the following format and order: 
 The researchers introduced themselves to interviewees and exchanged business cards. 
 The researchers provided a brief background on the project and on the interview format. 
 The research leader of the interview reviewed the informed consent issues/rights and 
obtained verbal consent of the interviewee(s). 
 The interviewee(s) was assured of confidentiality and anonymity to the extent that no 
company name, no individual name, and no drug name would be disclosed in any report. 
 The interviewee(s) was then solicited for his/her educational and professional experience. 
 The research leader of the interview administered the quantitative questionnaire verbally 
and explained any questions that the interviewee did not understand. 
 Key issues and areas of interest were identified from the interviewee’s response to the 
quantitative questionnaire, and provided the basis for some of the subsequent qualitative 
questions and discussion. 
 The research team administered the qualitative questionnaire to the interviewee based on 
the individual’s experience and responses to the quantitative questionnaire (i.e. an 
interview of an individual responsible for Phase II and Phase III clinical trials centered on 
these respective phases rather than on Phase I). 
 The researchers wrapped-up the interview by expressing thanks and appreciation to 
interviewees and encouraged the subjects to contact the team with any questions or 
additional thoughts. 
 
Upon conclusion of a company visit and interview session, we discussed major findings and 
ideas.  The interview notes were typed up by one or more of us and reviewed for accuracy.  The 
quantitative questionnaire responses were entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and 
analyzed using the Data Analysis function “Descriptive Statistics.”  
 
In all cases, Professor Berndt, Dr. Strobeck, and I signed thank you letters that were then mailed 
to the interviewees.  In a few cases, interviewees followed up with us with additional 
information.  Upon completion of the research, all interviewees will receive a copy of a white 
paper document edited by Professor Berndt, Dr. Strobeck, and me.  The paper will include my 
and Dr. Strobeck’s combined research theses, summarized and edited as appropriate, as well as 
information from interviews with FDA officials that will take place later in May, 2004. 
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Chapter 4: Results – Drug Approval and PDUFA Analysis  
Section 4.01 Drug Approval Trends 
In order to evaluate the hypothesis that “ceteris paribus, PDUFA I and PDUFA II reduced 
NDA/BLA approval times relative to pre-PDUFA time trends and had a net positive benefit to 
companies compared to PDUFA direct costs,” we analyzed average approval times from 1979 to 
2002 and developed a multivariate regression equation to help evaluate the net benefits.  
Statistical analysis was performed on the NDA/BLA approval time for the following five distinct 
time periods:  1) 10/0/1979 to 09/30/2002 (n=649); 2) 10/01/1979 to 09/30/1986 (n=168); 3) 
10/01/1986 to 08/31/1992 (n=153); 4) 09/01/1992 to 09/30/1997 – PDUFA I (n=188); and 5) 
10/01/1997 to 09/30/2002 – PDUFA II (n=140).  As seen in Figure 4-1, the mean approval time 
decreased from 33.09 months during the 1979-1986 timeframe to 18.34 months during PDUFA I 
and 14.63 months during PDUFA II.  Substantial decreases are also noted for the median.  The 
complete descriptive statistics for these time periods can be found in Appendix C: PDUFA 
Analysis Additional Results. 
 
Therapeutic classes were investigated in a similar manner over these five time intervals.  I was 
focused on CNS related drugs and cardiovascular related drugs.  Additional information on anti-
neoplastic and anti-infective drugs can be found in the thesis “The Drug Development Process:  
Evaluation of PDUFA I and II and an Investigation into Reducing Drug Development Times” by 
Dr. Matthew Strobeck. 
 
By law, the FDA does not disclose what NMEs it is currently reviewing or which ones have 
failed.  Thus, there is the issue of censoring of the data.  It is entirely feasible that the FDA is 
currently reviewing NMEs that were submitted during the PDUFA II time period.  The absence 
of these NMEs results in lower mean approval times and a lower sample size for PDUFA II.  The 
last approved NDA/BLA in the data set during the PDUFA II time period was for the drug 
aprepitant (Emend™).  The drug was submitted to the FDA for NDA review on 09/27/2002 and 
approved on 03/26/2003. 
 
Similar trends as seen across all therapeutic areas were observed in the cardiovascular drugs as 
depicted in Figure 4-2.  The same five time intervals as described for all therapeutics in Figure 
4-1 were used.  The sample size for all cardiovascular drugs from 1979 to 2002 was 113.  The 
sample sizes for the time intervals 1979 to 1986, 1986 to 1992, PDUFA I, and PDUFA II were 
37, 27, 32, and 17 respectively.  The smaller sample size in the PDUFA II period may be 
indicative of right censoring of the data.   
 
In contrast to the mean and median for all therapeutic areas and for cardiovascular drugs, the 
CNS drugs do not follow a decreasing trend.  Figure 4-3 shows that approval times decrease 
steadily from the 1979-1986 period to PDUFA I; however, during PDUFA II, it appears that the 
mean and median time increased roughly 10% from PDUFA I.  The sample size for all CNS 
drugs from 1979 to 2002 was 66.  The sample sizes for the time intervals 1979 to 1986, 1986 to 
1992, PDUFA I, and PDUFA II were 15, 13, 26, and 12 respectively.  Similarly to the 
cardiovascular drugs, right censoring of data may be an issue for the CNS drugs.  
Figure 4-1:  Mean and Median Approval Times for All Drugs from 1979 to 2002 
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Figure 4-2:  Mean and Median Approval Times for Cardiovascular Drugs from 1979 to 2002 
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Figure 4-3:  Mean and Median Approval Times for CNS Drugs from 1979 to 2002 
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While the overall decreasing time trend in NDA approval times is not surprising and is supported 
by analysis by Reichert from Tufts28, the potential increases in approval times in PDUFA II 
across certain therapeutic is concerning for the industry.  Perceptions of PDUFA by the industry 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5: Results - Drug Development Surveys. 
 
The impact of PDUFA can been seen in a histogram of the approval times per time period as 
shown in Figure 4-4.  The four histograms show that approval time shifts substantially towards 
the left, a reduction in time.  Additionally, moving from 1979 to PDUFA II, the variance 
(standard deviation) in approval times is compressed. 
 
Survival curves for all NDA approvals, priority approvals, and standard approvals were 
constructed and are shown in Figure 4-5, Figure 4-6, and Figure 4-7 respectively.  The use of the 
term “survival curves” is not completely accurate, as hazard models were not estimated; 
however, when looking at the proportion of approvals completed within a fixed time period, the 
graph is somewhat analogous to survival curves.  The survival curves show the percentage of 
approvals remaining over time in months.  As the time scale increases, more NDAs are approved 
for the time period grouping and thus the approval percentage declines.   
                                                 
 
28 
28 Reichert, Janice M.  “Trend in Development and Approval Times for New Therapeutics in the United States.”  
Nature Reviews Drug Discovery.  Sept. 2003;2. 
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Figure 4-4:  Histogram of Approval Times for ’79-’86, ’86-’92, PDUFA I, and PDUFA II
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1979-1986:  
 Mean = 33.09 
 Median = 26.68 
 Stdev =  21.26 
 
1986-1992: 
 Mean = 27.79 
 Median = 23.49 
 Stdev = 18.94 
 
PDUFA I: 
 Mean = 18.34 
 Median = 14.97 
 Stdev = 11.62 
 
PDUFA II: 
 Mean = 14.63 
 Median = 11.93 
 Stdev = 9.59
The faster decline in percentage approval remaining of the PDUFA I and II time periods relative 
to the pre-PDUFA time periods indicate faster approvals.  The survival curves for all NDA 
approvals show clear separations between the PDUFA curves and the pre-PDUFA (1979-1986, 
1986-1992) curves and indicate significant reductions in approval times.  PDUFA II and PDUFA 
I had 50% of NDAs approved by twelve months and fifteen months, respectively, in contrast to 
twenty-seven and thirty months for 1979-1986 and 1986-1992 respectively.   
 
The survival curves of priority approvals and standard approvals show similar separations among 
PDUFA and non-PDUFA curves.  Contrasting the priority approvals with standard approvals 
reveals a dramatic reduction in 50% approval time – eight months for priority in PDUFA II 
compared to roughly seventeen months for standard in PDUFA II.   
 
It is important to note that PDUFA I and II require actions within certain time frames as 
discussed in Chapter 1: Introduction and Background.  These action dates should not be confused 
with approval dates.  While FDA has met the PDUFA action dates, as they must by law, the 
approval times extend beyond the action dates.  Based on the survival curves and histograms, it 
is feasible to argue that PDUFA, by mandating better response times via action dates, has 
lowered the NDA approval times substantially.  This will be further demonstrated through the 
multivariate regression analysis. 
 
Figure 4-5:  Survival Curves for All NDA Types 
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Figure 4-6: Survival Curves for Priority Approvals 
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Figure 4-7:  Survival Curves for Standard Approvals 
Survival Curves for Standard Approvals
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Section 4.02 Multivariate Linear Regression Results 
Multivariate linear regression was used to estimate the coefficients for the regression variables as 
described in Figure 2-1.  The regression coefficients are displayed in the table in Figure 4-8 
along with their respective p-values.  The variables (coefficient, p-value) that are statistically 
significant include PRIORITY (-0.495, >0.000), TREND_PDUFA1 (-0.018, 0.002), 
TREND_PDUFA2 (-0.020, 0.001), DRG_ANTIINFECT (-0.283, >0.000), DRG_NEOPLASTIC 
(-0.261, 0.009), and DRG_AIDS (-0.857, >0.000). 
Figure 4-8:  Regression Coefficients and P-Values 
32 
s 
Regressions were run which excluded all 
therapeutic areas or included one therapeutic 
area at a time.  These regressions indicated 
that the coefficients for the variables 
LNDINDNDAMONTHS, TIMETREND, 
PRIORITY, TREND_PDUFA1, 
TREND_PDUFA2, ORPHAN, and NATION 
were stable across therapeutic areas.  
Regressions were performed that indicated 
that the coefficients were temporally stable a
well. 
 
The TREND_PDUFA1 and 
TREND_PDUFA2 variables have a negative 
coefficient, indicating a reductive effect of 
about 2% annually on NDA approval times relative to pre-PDUFA years.  Additional variables 
(coefficient, p-value, 95% confidence interval) that appear to be trending toward significance 
include DRG_CARDIO (0.113, 0.090, [-0.0175, 0.2437]) and TIMETREND (-0.015, 0.079, [-
0.0325 0.0018]).  The therapeutic category DRG_ANTIINFECT did not include any of the drugs 
included in the DRG_AIDS category. 
Coefficients P-value
INTERCEPT 3.405 < 0.001
LNINDNDAMONTHS 0.025 0.302
TIMETREND -0.015 0.079
PRIORITY -0.495 < 0.001
TREND_PDUFA1 -0.018 0.002
TREND_PDUFA2 -0.020 0.001
ORPHAN 0.095 0.145
NATION -0.049 0.274
DRG_CARDIO 0.113 0.090
DRG_ANTIINFECT -0.283 < 0.001
DRG_NEOPLASTIC -0.261 0.009
DRG_CNS 0.066 0.418
DRG_BIO 0.034 0.660
DRG_AIDS -0.857 < 0.001
 
Drugs that received a priority designation by the FDA were approved considerably faster than 
standard approvals.  This was visible as well in the survival curve graphs across all time 
segments from 1979 to 2002.  As stated in Chapter 1: Introduction and Background, PDUFA set 
short action dates of six months for priority-designated drugs.  It is reassuring to see that this 
action date did indeed result in faster approvals on average for priority therapeutics. 
 
The signs of the coefficients for all the variables, with the exception of the DRG_CNS and 
DRG_CARDIO variables, were expected to be less than zero assuming that the variables reduced 
approval times.  The LNDINDNDAMONTHS and ORPHAN variables were greater than zero, 
indicating that approval times were higher for drugs with longer IND to NDA times and for 
orphan designated drugs.  I assumed that orphan drugs, due to their novelty and benefit in areas 
of high unmet medical need, would be approved faster relative to other NDAs.  In fact, 60% of 
drugs designated as orphan drugs during 1979 to 2002 received priority approval.  The effect of 
priority designation is likely to be more important for review than the designation of orphan 
drug.  The ORPHAN variable had a positive coefficient indicating a longer approval time.  A 
possible explanation, as stated during interviews with industry interviewees experienced with 
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orphan drugs, was that the novel nature of the orphan therapeutic often complicates and extends 
the review process.   
 
Contrary to my expectations, the variable that measures the time spent in development was not 
statistically significant in decreasing the NDA approval time (p-value = 0.302).  The sign of the 
coefficient was positive; however, arguments supporting a coefficient of either sign could be 
made.  For example, one could argue that longer IND-NDA development times reflect more 
complicated drugs and thus NDA approval times would be longer.  Conversely, once could argue 
that the FDA has more experience and knowledge with the drug and NDA approval times would 
be accelerated.  The more detailed testing of either of these assumptions is beyond the scope of 
this research. 
 
The omitted category in the regression was the DRG_OTHER class that accounted for all other 
therapeutics.  The coefficients for the therapeutic dummy variables were an indication in increase 
or reduction in approval time relative to this omitted class. 
 
Applying the generated regression coefficients to the generic regression in Equation 2-1, the 
definitive regression equation below is derived. 
Equation 4-1:  PDUFA Approval Time Definitive Regression Equation 
ln(approval time) = 3.405 + 0.025 · LNINDNDAMONTHS  –  0.015 · 
TIMETREND  – 0.495 · PRIORITY – 0.018 · TREND_PDUFA1 – 0.020 · 
TREND_PDUFA2 + 0.095 · ORPHAN – 0.049 · NATION + 0.113 · 
DRG_CARDIO – 0.283 · DRG_ANTIINFECT – 0.261 · DRG_NEOPLASTIC + 
0.066 · DRG_CNS + 0.034 · DRG_BIO – 0.857 · DRG_AIDS 
 
In order to better visualize the effects of PDUFA, the regression equation variables were 
evaluated and the graph in Figure 4-10 was constructed evaluating the variables as described in 
the following paragraphs.  
 
For the binary dummy variables for the therapeutic areas (DRG_[Therapeutic Area]), the 
variables were evaluated at their sample means, which is their respective proportion of the 
sample of drugs.  This percent of the total drugs is shown in Figure 4-9.  Similarly, the variables 
PRIORITY, ORPHAN, and NATION were evaluated at their sample means with values of 
0.300, 0.179, and 0.435 respectively.   
 
The sample mean for LNDINDNDAMONTHS equaled 4.265.  This average included four zero 
values for drugs that were missing IND to NDA data.  Excluding the zero values did not have a 
significant effect on the sample mean or the graphed outcome so the values were included for 
completeness. 
 
The TIMETREND variable was incremented from one to twenty-four with one corresponding to 
the government fiscal year starting on 10/01/1979 and ending on 09/30/1980.  
TREND_PDUFA1 and TREND_PDUFA2 were the product of the TIMETREND variables at a 
given year multiplied respectively by the PDUFA1 or PDUFA2 binary that was either zero or 
one for the timeframe.  For example in the 1993 government fiscal year, PDUFA1 equaled one 
and TIMETREND equaled fifteen so TREND_PDUFA1 equals fifteen.  The resulting natural log 
of approval months for each year was converted to NDA time in months via Equation 4-2.  The 
standard error of regression, used as a correction factor, was 0.575. 
Figure 4-9:  NME Therapeutic Area Composition 
Therapeutic Area Number of NMEs % of Total
Cardiovascular 113 17.4%
Anti-infectives 96 14.8%
Anti-neoplastic 44 6.8%
CNS 66 10.2%
Biologics 86 13.3%
AIDS 13 2.0%
All other areas 231 35.6%
TOTAL 649  
Equation 4-2:  Predicted NDA Time 
))(5.0( 2Pr RgrsnofStndErrsLNAppMontheTimeNDAApprovaledicted •+=  
As shown in Figure 4-10 below, evaluation of the regression equation with the PDUFA binary 
variables turned on (PDUFA) and with the PDUFA variables turned off (counterfactual) show a 
significant divergence of the lines upon enactment of the PDUFA I legislation.   
Figure 4-10:  Regression Predicted NDA Approval Time in PDUFA and Counterfactual 
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The approval times are predicted for an NDA submitted in the given year.  According to the 
regression coefficients and p-values, NDAs in the cardiovascular or CNS therapeutic fields 
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would have longer approval relative to the “other” class of drugs; however, these coefficients 
were not statistically significant whereas the coefficients for anti-infectives and anti-neoplastics 
were significant, as was that for AIDS. 
Section 4.03 FDA Commissioner Vacancy Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 2: Methods – Drug Approval and PDUFA Analysis, four different 
methods were used in regression analysis with the commissioner vacancy ratio.  As shown in 
Figure 4-3, the coefficients are positive in methods two and four but negative in methods one and 
three.  Additionally, the p-values are all significant with the exception of method one.   
 
In method three, given that COMMISSX1 is one when the ratio is zero and given that 
COMMISSX2 is the natural log of the ratio when the ratio is greater than zero, the expectation is 
that the signs on the coefficients would be opposite (COMMISSX1 negative, COMMISSX2 
positive).  However, while the sign is negative for COMMISSX2, it is positive for 
LNCOMMISS and COMMIS_VAC, which is inconsistent. 
Equation 4-3:  Commissioner Vacancy Regression Coefficients 
A potential explanation for the 
contradictory coefficients lies in 
the distribution of the vacancy 
ratios.  From Figure 4-11, it is 
observed that 61% of the total 
vacancy days lie in the PDUFA 
timeframe.  Given the shortened 
NDA approval times as shown by 
the histograms, survival curves, and regression, it is not surprising that a greater number of 
NDAs will have some vacancy ratio greater than zero during the PDUFA periods.  In point of 
fact, of the 321 NDAs approved pre-PDUFA, only 6% had a ratio >= 0.5 as compared to 33% of 
NDAs approved during PDUFA.   
Method Variable(s) Coefficients P-value
1 COMMISSIONER -0.038 0.635
2 LNCOMMISS 0.051 0.017
3 COMMISSX1 -0.138 0.023
COMMISSX2 -0.155 < 0.001
4 COMMISS_VAC 0.322 < 0.001
Figure 4-11:  Commissioner Vacancy – Distribution of Days 
Vacancy Start Vacancy End Elapsed Days % of Total Days
6/30/1979 10/21/1979 113 5%
1/20/1981 4/13/1981 83 4%
9/11/1983 7/15/1984 308 14%
12/17/1989 11/7/1990 325 15%
2/28/1997 11/30/1998 640 30%
1/19/2001 11/14/2002 664 31%
TOTAL 2,133 100%  
Figure 4-12:  Commissioner Vacancy PDUFA Distribution 
Non-PDUFA NDAs
(n = 321)
PDUFA NDAs
(n = 328)
Ratio = 0 41% 41%
Ratio >= 0.5 6% 33%
Ratio < 0.5 and > 0 54% 26%  
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Figure 4-13:  Distribution of Commissioner Vacancy Ratio 
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The distortion of ratios greater than 0.5 falling under PDUFA and the ratios less than 0.5 falling 
under pre-PDUFA time periods is potentially responsible for the conflicting regression 
information.  Manipulations of this ratio yield various results indicating a lack of robustness in 
the analysis.  This suggests that there are other confounding issues at hand.  According to a 
source at FDA, other factors such as incidence of safety withdrawals, reviewing division 
turnover, medical reviewer turnover, and new data submissions for the NDA would need to be 
taken into account.   
Section 4.04 PDUFA NPV Analysis  
The NPV in 1992 dollars of PDUFA, PV of PDUFA ∆Benefit minus the PV of PDUFA fees, 
across four therapeutic areas was calculated using real discount rates from 0.5% to 10% as 
shown in Figure 4-14.  The therapeutic classes included in the calculation are cardiovascular (n = 
41), CNS (n = 36), anti-infectives (n = 37), and anti-neoplastics (n = 22).  Unfortunately, sales 
data was not readily available for some of the drugs in the therapeutic class and thus the sample 
sizes indicated were lower than the total drugs in the therapeutic class.  The total number of 
PDUFA drugs in each therapeutic class is as follows:  cardiovascular (n = 49), CNS (n = 38), 
anti-infective (n = 40), and anti-neoplastics (n = 26).  The number of drugs evaluated for these 
classes totaled 136 of the 150 possible or approximately 90%. 
 
The NME data provided by FDA had a total of 328 NDAs approved during PDUFA I and II.  
The NDAs with available sales data from the four therapeutic classes total 136 and represent 
42% of all the NDAs approved during PDUFA I and II.  Significant therapeutic areas such as 
gastrointestinal and metabolic/endocrine, which represent at least 15% of worldwide drug 
sales29, were not evaluated but would add significantly to the overall NPV. 
                                                 
36 
29 Mathieu, M.P., ed. “Therapeutic Categories:  Drug Sales as a Percentage of Worldwide Market, 2002 vs. 2006”  
PAREXEL’s Pharmaceutical R&D Statistical Sourcebook 2003/2004, 2003, p. 17. 
 
The total PV benefit of sales, indicated in solid black in Figure 4-14, ranges from 1.64 billion 
dollars to just over eight billion dollars.  The solid white bars indicate the NPV after the PDUFA 
fees are subtracted.  Relative to the PV benefit, the total PDUFA fees are very small (See Figure 
4-15).  At a real discount rate of 5%, the PDUFA fees are only 3.9% of the ∆Benefit. 
Figure 4-14:  PV of Sales and NPV of PDUFA 
$-
$1.00
$2.00
$3.00
$4.00
$5.00
$6.00
$7.00
$8.00
$9.00
0.5% 1.5% 2.5% 3.5% 4.5% 5.5% 6.5% 7.5% 8.5% 9.5%
Real Discount Rate
$ 
B
ill
io
ns
PV Sales Difference ($ B) NPV ($ B)
 
Figure 4-15:  PV of Total PDUFA Fees 
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Figure 4-16.  The NPVs for the 
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Additional Results. 
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please refer to the thesis “The Drug Development Process:  Evaluation of PDUFA I and II and
Investigation into Reducing Drug Development Times” by Dr. Matthew Strobeck. 
Figure 4-16:  NPVs for Cardiovascular and CNS Therap
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Investigation of the distribution of NPVs on an NME by NME basis shows that several NMEs in 
en 
t a disaggregated level, the distribution of NPVs for CNS and cardiovascular drugs was skewed 
rom an economic perspective, the NPV of PDUFA can be viewed as innovative returns, returns 
 
s a 
 
 they 
                                                
each therapeutic class do not have a positive NPV.  Simply stated, the sales did not offset the 
costs of PDUFA.  It is likely that these drugs did not recoup their development costs either giv
the low cost of PDUFA fees relative to overall research and development fees.  Note that in 
calculating the NPVs of the NDAs, relatively conservative assumptions were made and the 
benefits of PDUFA were still overwhelmingly positive at an aggregate level. 
 
A
in the positive direction as shown for both therapeutic areas in Figure 4-17and Figure 4-18.  The 
negative NPVs as a percentage of the sample were 11% and 12% for CNS and cardiovascular 
respectively at a real discount rate of 5%. 
 
F
that can be plowed back into the company to generate growth.  At the real discount rate of 5%, 
there is roughly $7.68 billion of innovative returns.  If one accepts the premise that PDUFA was
in a large part responsible for speeding up NDA approvals, the $7.68 billion represents a 
significant benefit accrued to industry.  Additionally, the NPV of PDUFA can be viewed a
proxy for the social benefit enjoyed by healthcare consumers and society.  However, it is 
difficult to evaluate the consumers’ surplus due to the moral hazard associated with health
insurance.30  In this sense, there is excess consumption of healthcare by individuals because
 
30 Moral hazard is the propensity of individuals or groups to take on riskier or hazardous behavior because of 
guarantees or provisions in a contract.  
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ount Rate of 5% 
are not paying at their marginal cost of care, which in many cases exceeds the cost of their 
insurance.  It is difficult to estimate what consumers would be willing to pay for the drug in
absence of insurance and even more challenging to separate out the individuals who are not 
necessarily benefiting from the drug.  Ideally, measurement of the social benefit would inclu
measurement of change in quality of life, change in workplace productivity as a result of fewer 
days missed due to illness, change in healthcare management practices around the therapeutic 
area, cost of treatment of any related side effects and toxicities, and cost of withdrawal in the 
case where the therapeutic is deemed unsafe.   
Figure 4-17:  Distribution of NPVs for CNS Drugs at Real Disc
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Figure 4-18:  Distribution of NPVs for Cardiovascular Drugs at Real Discount Rate of 5% 
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An often-stated concern of accelerated approval is that unsafe or ineffective drugs will reach the 
market and then be withdrawn.  The cost in terms of mortality and morbidity of patients who 
n = 36 
 values = 4 
n = 41 
 values = 5 negative
% of total = 12% 
negative
% of total = 11% 
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ere treated with the drug can be significant.  A study by the General Accounting Office31 
s 
 
 2) fourteen drugs were listed as being 
ithdrawn but not all were included in the analyses; 3) the timeframes analyzed by the GAO do 
1979 
tion of interest is the percentage increase in PV of profitability.  Assuming 
that Selling, General &Administrative (SG&A), Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), and other standard 
d tual or counterfactual PDUFA scenarios, the % 
w
(GAO) found that from 1985 to 1992, pre-PDUFA, the percentage of drugs withdrawn was 
3.10% versus 3.47% for the period of 1993 to 2000 (PDUFA).  In absolute numbers, 193 NME
were approved pre-PDUFA and six were withdrawn.  During this 1993 to 2000 period, FDA
approved 259 NMEs and nine were withdrawn.   
 
The FDA disagreed with the GAO findings and had the following criticisms:  1) the GAO 
excluded biologics from the withdrawal analyses;
w
not match the pre-PDUFA/post-PDUFA time periods; 4) statistical significance and data 
censoring is not addressed.  According to FDA analysis, the withdrawal percentage from 
to1992 was close to 2.5%.  For NDAs approved during PDUFA I until 1999, the withdrawal rate 
has been 2.6%.32
Section 4.05 Profitability Calculations 
An additional calcula
costs remaine  relatively constant in the ac
increase in PV profitability can be measured as indicated below in Equation 4-4 since this 
common cost terms fall out of the equation. 
Equation 4-4:  PDUFA Profitability Percentage Increase 
tualCounterfacNPV
SalesNPVitypPVinincrease rofitabil ∆=  
 
Figure 4-19:  PDUFA Related Percentage Increase in Profitability 
Anti-Inf. Anti-Neo.
1% 0.46% 0.61% 0.56% 0.27% 0.26%
2% 1.01% 1.31% 1.23% 0.63% 0.64%
3% 1.56% 2.01% 1.90% 0.98% 1.02%
4% 2.11% 2.70% 2.56% 1.33% 1.39%
5% 2.65% 3.38% 3.22% 1.68% 1.76%
6% 3.18% 4.07% 3.87% 2.02% 2.12%
7% 3.71% 4.74% 4.52% 2.36% 2.47%
8% 4.24% 5.41% 5.17% 2.69% 2.82%
9% 4.76% 6.08% 5.81% 3.02% 3.16%
10% 5.28% 6.74% 6.45% 3.35% 3.49%
%
Real Discount
 Rate Aggregate CNS Cardio
 
As indicated in Figure 4-19, the aggregate percentage increase in profitability at a real discount 
rate is 2.65%.  Sensitivity analysis by varying the discount rate indicates substantial increases in 
                                                 
31 Mathieu, M.P., ed. “A GAO Study on Drug Withdrawal Rates and PDUFA.”  PAREXEL’s Pharmaceutical R&D 
Statistical Sourcebook 2003/2004, 2003, p. 250. 
32 FDA internal analysis and presentation provided by Ed Hass. 
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roducts in the CNS and cardiovascular therapeutic 
lasses, it is not surprising to see larger percentage increases in profitability due to accelerated 
.06 PDUFA Study Limitations 
As previously stated, the sales data used in the calculations represents United States sales only. 
the United States affects international approvals was 
pproval time length in the counterfactual analysis was not accounted for in this model.  The 
t 
 NDAs that 
ere not approved or withdrawn from review.  Due to confidentiality obligations to sponsor 
ere 
uld 
oes 
profitability.  In a sense, this can be interpreted as the return to profitability that companies get 
for “investing” in the FDA via PDUFA fees.  
 
Given the substantial number of blockbuster p
c
time to market.  A more robust analysis of profitability conferred by PDUFA would include 
average free cash flows from therapeutics.  It is my intention to conduct this analysis in future 
studies. 
Section 4
The extent to which accelerated approval in 
not investigated or accounted for in this research study.  If earlier United States approval 
encourages earlier approval in foreign countries, then the NPV benefit will be even greater. 
 
Patent protection expiration issues and the reduction of effective patent life due to increased 
a
analysis here is likely understating the net benefits of PDUFA for if anything, reducing paten
life would decrease the sales in the counterfactual and increase the NPV benefit. 
 
Of significant concern regarding the validity of this analysis is the lack of data on
w
companies, the FDA was unable to provide detailed or aggregate information on NDAs that w
rejected or withdrawn.  In order to fully account for the costs and benefits of PDUFA, we wo
want to consider the costs associated with failed or withdrawn NDAs.  It is possible that failure 
rates of NDAs did not change from the pre-PDUFA time period to the PDUFA time period; 
however, if failure rates increased during PDUFA, this added cost is unaccounted for in the 
current analysis.  This could have a significant negative impact on the overall benefit of the 
findings that are reported herein.  Likewise, a reduction in failure or withdrawal rates would 
increase the benefits delivered by PDUFA.  A more robust analysis would have performed a 
sensitivity analysis regarding percentage failures with associated costs.  However, this issue d
not negate the benefit of faster approval to sponsors that receive approval. 
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Chapter 5: Results - Drug Development Surveys 
Section 5.01 Variability – A Constant Theme 
A consistent theme throughout the interviews conducted during this research was the high degree 
of variability in almost all facets of interaction, communication, and organization between 
industry and the FDA.  From an industry perspective, drug development consists of reducing 
uncertainty and variability through planned clinical trials.  Increased volatility and consequently 
reduced predictability of interactions with a regulatory agency make a difficult and expensive 
process even more cumbersome and fraught with risk.  As mentioned in the study by Dimasi in 
Chapter 1: Introduction and Background, increasing the probability of success of a drug across 
phases of development can have a substantial impact on reducing costs of development.  
Reducing the variability of the interactions with the FDA may aid in reducing this risk according 
to industry interviewees. 
 
The hypothesis “industry believes that communication with the FDA is inadequate during late 
stage clinical studies” was evaluated mainly by quantitative questions regarding communication; 
however, the sections discussed in this chapter all have the consistent theme that additional 
communication and interaction could help resolve the ambiguity and information asymmetry 
between the FDA and industry. 
Section 5.02 Quantitative Survey Analysis – General Points 
The quantitative survey was administered to a total of thirty-six people.  Seven additional 
questions were added to the survey after nine individuals had been interviewed.  It was not 
possible to obtain their responses to those questions post interview.  In these cases, the question 
response is designated as Not Administered (NA).  A value of No Response (NR) is indicated 
when the interviewee did not have knowledge regarding the question or declined to respond to 
the question.  The sample size (n) for each question is determined by subtracting the no 
responses and not administered from the thirty-six respondents.  The descriptive statistics (mean, 
median, etc.) for each question are based on the sample size (n) and exclude the NR and NA 
responses. 
 
As shown in Figure B-2 in Appendix B:  Interview Questionnaires, the quantitative questionnaire 
had four different sections, each employing a scale from one to five with different rankings 
associated with the numbers.  In many cases, interviewees responded with a value between the 
integer rankings (denoted as a dashed line between the stated values in the graphs).  These 
responses were deemed to be acceptable and are included in the analysis.  Descriptive statistics 
for all the quantitative questions are provided in the appendix Figure D-1.  A subset of the 
quantitative questions are addressed in this thesis; the remainder are addressed by Dr. Matthew 
Strobeck or in future publications. 
 
The quantitative responses were analyzed in three major ways:  1) in aggregate; 2) separated 
according to company type – biotech versus pharmaceutical; and 3) according to interviewee 
position  - executive vice president and higher compared to vice president and lower.  Students t-
test was used to compare results in methods two and three within a question; only a small 
number of results were found to be statistically significant in the comparisons.  These results are 
reported where appropriate.  This absence is not surprising given a maximum sample size of 
thirty-six.  The p-values for all the t-test comparisons are reported in the appendix in Figure D-1. 
Section 5.03 Industry’s Perception of the FDA 
To evaluate the commonly held perception that industry has a negative opinion of the FDA, we 
asked interviewees to rate the agency’s ability to regulate drug development and appropriately 
weigh risk/benefits of new drugs.  Sixty-four percent of respondents, as seen in Figure 5-1, rated 
the agency’s competency in these areas as “Good.”  Qualitative comments from interviewees 
indicated a great respect for the FDA as a whole and the challenging role that the agency plays in 
evaluating drugs. 
Figure 5-1:  Rating - Overall Perception of FDA 
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Interviewees were asked to rate the FDA’s effectiveness of keeping unsafe drugs from the 
market.  Again, the vast majority of responses were positive, with 83% of respondents indicating 
the agency did a “Good” to “Excellent” job (See Figure 5-2). 
Figure 5-2:  Rating - Keeping Unsafe Drugs from Market 
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How would you rate the FDA's effectiveness of keeping unsafe drugs from the market?
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The overall positive ratings for both these questions were relatively surprising to me given the 
vitriol that is often apparent in the press.  However, many respondents qualified their answers to 
the question regarding unsafe drugs with the comment that the agency was partly responsible for 
delaying the progress of some very good drugs to market and in some cases being overly 
vigilant.  A global head of research and development stated that the agency weighed drug 
development as a risk-benefit analysis.  The individual suggested that a risk-risk analysis might 
instead be more appropriate where the trade off between the risks of approving a drug with 
certain safety issues is weighed against the risks that patients face without the therapeutic 
available as a treatment option.  This particular interviewee stated that often it is the risk of the 
drug being used in inappropriate populations or combinations that causes safety concerns. 
Figure 5-3:  Comparison by Position of Response to “Efforts to Reduce Approval Times” Question 
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Interviewees were asked to indicate how much progress the FDA had made in reducing approval 
and development times.  Sixty-five percent of the interviewees (n=34, mean = 3.53, median = 4, 
mode = 4, stdev = 0.99) indicated that at a minimum they “Agree” that the FDA has made 
significant efforts to reduce approval times.  Additionally, 65% of the interviewees (n=34, mean 
= 2.15, median = 2, mode = 1, stdev = 1.10) did not think that the EMEA was more efficient at 
approving drugs than the FDA.  However, 71% of interviewees (n=34, mean = 2.12, median = 2, 
mode = 2, stdev = 0.91) indicated that at a minimum they “Disagree” that the FDA has made 
significant efforts to reduce drug development times. 
 
None of the t-test comparisons of the questions above for company type and level was 
statistically significant.  However, the t-test comparison by position within the company for the 
question of whether the interviewee believed the FDA had made significant efforts to reduce 
approval times was trending towards significance (p-value = 0.057).  The responses were 
normalized as percentages of the sample size and are compared in Figure 5-3 above. 
Section 5.04 Organization and Structure at the FDA 
A recurrent theme in the qualitative survey of industry was the perception that the FDA is 
organized like a “cottage” industry.  In other words, the divisions are relatively independent and 
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do not function in a similar manner when interacting with the drug sponsor.  It is not debatable 
that the FDA divisions under the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) are engaged 
in different therapeutic areas and will thus have different requirements for safety and efficacy.  
However, the way in which the divisions interact and respond to sponsors is highly variable in 
regards to simple things such as returning phone calls to more complex issues such as feedback 
on clinical protocols and NDAs. 
 
Many of the interviewees acknowledged that the FDA medical reviewers have a very difficult 
job to do and believe that the reviewers are overworked and underpaid for their efforts.  Again 
the consistent theme in regards to the reviewers was the high degree of variability in training, 
accountability, and quality.  As seen in Figure 5-4, interviewees most often ranked medical 
reviewer quality as “Fair.”   
 
Similarly, the respondents indicated that the accountability, defined as responsiveness and 
commitment to agreed upon protocols, of medical reviewers to the sponsor company was most 
often “Fair” (n = 33, mean = 3.06, median = 3, mode = 3, stdev = 0.76).  Interviewees indicated 
that they believed the training of medical reviewers upon joining the agency, not previous 
education and experience, was generally “Fair” to “Poor” (n=22, mean = 2.86, median = 3, mode 
= 3, stdev = 0.82).   
Figure 5-4:  Rating - Quality of FDA Reviewers 
1 = Bad 
2 = Poor 
3 = Fair 
4 = Good 
5 = Excellent 
n = 32 
mean = 3.33 
median = 3 
mode = 3 
stdev = 0.70 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Bad  - Poor  - Fair  - Good  - Excellent NR NA
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers. The quality of FDA
reviewers is:
 
In contrast, when asked to evaluate the direct leadership (team lead, deputy division director, 
division director) of medical reviewers, respondents ranked the leadership higher than the 
reviewers (See Figure 5-5).  Qualitatively, interviewees indicated that interactions with 
leadership one or more levels above the medical reviewer were generally very positive. 
 
During the qualitative survey, respondents often stated that excellent medical reviewers would 
become team leads and move up through the hierarchy at the agency.  This might help explain 
the higher ratings for the direct leadership.  Quantitative responses regarding the medical 
reviewers were not statistically different by company type or by interviewee position according 
to t-test comparisons. 
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Interviewees expressed significant concern over the turnover rate of medical reviewers at the 
agency.  While most companies acknowledged that turnover was inevitable during the long drug 
development process, their perception was that turnover rates were too high.  More importantly, 
upon turnover of a medical reviewer, companies were often required to revisit many previous 
decisions that had been agreed upon with the agency.  Respondents indicated that they believe 
this caused unnecessary delays.  For example, interviewees from one company indicated that 
they experienced six months of back and forth communications to re-justify previous decisions 
and agreements made with the previous medical reviewer that had retired from the agency.  
Several respondents suggested that a formal handoff procedure and reorientation process would 
be appropriate in which major issues are resolved in a more expeditious manner.  Companies 
acknowledged that turnover within their company also delayed drug development in some cases.  
 
Unfortunately, no quantitative questions were asked directly on the consistency of the various 
therapeutic divisions within the FDA; however, in almost every interview, respondents indicated 
that there was a high degree of variability in competency, communication, and implementation 
of rules and regulations across divisions.  
 
Several divisions were described to have “best” practices that accelerated drug development.  
These practices included the following:  1) rapid turnaround of agreement on meeting minutes 
(in some cases before the end of the meeting); 2) invitation to the sponsor to give a half day 
presentation to the therapeutic division on a novel drug and the science; 3) open communication 
policy and twenty-four hour acknowledgement of phone call.   
Figure 5-5:  Rating - Direct Leadership of Medical Reviewers 
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n = 32 
mean = 3.45 
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mode = 4 
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Unfortunately, several divisions were accused of having “worst” practices which included very 
poor communication (only willing to discuss issues via letters and not the phone), extended time 
delay in resolving issues relative to FDA commitments, ambiguous advice and unwillingness to 
commit to protocols, obsession with minor statistical issues that are not therapeutic related (e.g. a 
patient’s bowel surgery while on an anti-depressant), and poor project management that resulted 
in multiple changes in agreed upon decisions between the sponsor and the FDA.   
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In many cases, the biotech companies in particular expressed concern over the merger of CBER 
and CDER.  Interviewees indicated that they believed CBER had many best practices (quick 
response to sponsor inquiries, accessibility of reviewers and leadership, proactive interest in 
science), which they fear might not continue under the auspices of CDER. 
Section 5.05 Measures of Industry’s Interactions with the FDA 
The pharmaceutical and biotech companies engaged in drug development report that they believe 
they are generally well organized to interact with the FDA (See Figure 5-6).  An elaborate 
regulatory group is setup within a company and it acts as the link between the rest of the 
company and the FDA.  This structure usually works very well according to the majority of 
interviewees.  However, several interviewees indicated that pressures from general management 
and marketing often forced the regulatory group into confrontational situations with the FDA.   
Figure 5-6:  Rating – Company Organized to Interact with FDA 
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Figure 5-7:  Rating - Company Progress in Reducing Dev. Times 
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When asked how much progress their company had made in reducing drug development times 
on issues that their company could control, interviewees indicated their company had done a 
“Fair” to “Average” job (See Figure 5-7).  Many individuals acknowledged that mergers or 
acquisitions had made reducing development times more difficult, in part because of inconsistent 
regulatory practices among the new partners. 
 
Interviewees were asked a series of questions regarding their company’s interaction with the 
FDA.  The questions probed whether the company was afraid to disagree with the agency on 
protocols and whether the company would run additional trials that were not required by the 
agency.  Interestingly, the responses from interviewees in regards to the regulatory group being 
afraid to pushback were distributed in a bimodal fashion (See Figure 5-8).  Sixteen individuals at 
a minimum “Agreed” that their company was afraid to pushback and sixteen at a minimum 
“Disagreed.”  According to the t-test comparison by company type, the biotechs and 
pharmaceutical company responses were trending towards being significantly different (p-value 
= 0.095).  Pharmaceutical company interviewees were more likely to agree that their regulatory 
groups were hesitant to confront the agency whereas biotech companies indicated they were 
more willing to confront the agency regarding clinical protocol requirements. 
Figure 5-8:  Rating- Regulatory Group Afraid to Pushback 
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A similar bimodal distribution existed in regards to the company running additional clinical trials 
that were not required but in anticipation of questions the FDA might ask (See Figure 5-9).  T-
test comparison according to company type indicated statistical significance (p-value = 0.006) 
See Figure 5-10.  Biotech companies often responded that they did not run additional trials 
whereas the pharmaceutical companies indicated that they did.  Qualitative responses indicated 
that this might be dependent on the division with which the sponsor was interacting.  
Respondents who indicated that their company ran additional trials indicated that the high level 
of ambiguity or lack of understanding between their company and the FDA was one potential 
cause. 
 
Furthermore, interviewees indicated that their companies did run additional trials in many cases 
for marketing and labeling purposes, but that these trials were almost always discussed with the 
FDA.  In a strict sense, a few interviewees agreed that these trials were not necessary for the 
approval of the drug based on what the FDA required.  However, some companies indicated that 
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they would run additional Phase II trials to ensure that they had identified the proper dose 
effective range in an effort to reduce the risk associated with Phase III trials.  
Figure 5-9:  Rating – Company Runs Additional Trials in Anticipation of Questions 
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Figure 5-10:  Comparison by Company Type of Response to “Additional Clinical Trials” Question 
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Many executives stated that failure to run appropriate Phase II trials to detect the appropriate 
dose ranges was instrumental in causing failures in Phase III.  Executives admitted that they had 
witnessed development programs within their company speed through Phase II to get to Phase 
III.  Interviewees stated that demands and pressures from the investment community contribute 
to this rush to get to the “next” phase. 
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Section 5.06 Communication and Interaction in Phase II, III, and the NDA 
As one global head of development at a company stated, “Communication leads to increased 
collaboration, and increased collaboration leads to successful drug development.”  As a 
regulatory agency, the FDA is not involved directly in drug development; however, its guidance 
and mandates can have significant effects on how companies engage in development.  Thus, 
information transparency and reduced information asymmetry are critical in improving the 
efficiency of development. 
 
To evaluate the hypothesis that “industry believes that communication with the FDA is 
inadequate during late stage clinical studies,” interviewees were asked directly to rate the 
following set of questions: 
 The quality of current communication with the FDA across phases of development 
 How valuable additional informal communication would be by phase 
 Their willingness to pay additional user fees to increase interactions  
 How much they would be willing to pay for these interactions per drug per phase 
 
When asked to rate the quality of communication in Phase II, 50% of the interviewees (n =36) 
gave a “Good” or higher rating (See Figure 5-11).  Forty-two percent indicated that 
communication was “Fair.”  The consistent theme in rating communication as “Fair” was the 
variability in communication, ranging from extremely poor to excellent, across therapeutic 
divisions. 
 
Communication in Phase III rated even higher than Phase II, with 69% percent of respondents 
indicating “Good” or higher (See Figure 5-12).  Sixty-six percent of respondents (n = 35) rated 
communication during the NDA phase as “Good” or higher (See Figure 5-13).  When asked how 
valuable the meeting was with the FDA between the end of Phase II and beginning of Phase III, 
98% rated it “Valuable” or higher.  Seventy-four percent rated this meeting as “Very Valuable”  
(See Figure 5-14).   
 
Interviewees were asked how valuable additional informal communication would be in the 
various phases.  The responses for Phase II (n=35, mean = 4.50, median = 5, mode = 5, stdev = 
0.53), Phase II (n=34, mean = 4.71, median = 5, mode = 5, stdev = 0.52), and NDA (n=35, mean 
= 4.74, median = 5, mode = 5, stdev = 0.51) were overwhelmingly in favor of additional 
informal communication with 97% of responses rated as “Valuable” or “Very Valuable”  (See 
Figure D-2 in the appendices).   
 
When asked their willingness to pay for additional interaction and assistance in Phase II and 
Phase III, responses were more variable.  However, the mean and median scores for both phases 
indicate that industry would be willing to pay additional monies to the FDA.  In some cases, 
respondents indicated that they were unwilling to pay additional monies due to concerns about 
how PDUFA monies were currently being used.  Furthermore, respondents indicated that there 
would need to be mechanisms to gauge incremental quality of personnel, assistance, and the 
types of issues that would be useful to review. 
 
 
Figure 5-11:  Rating - Quality of Communication - Phase II 
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Figure 5-12:  Rating - Quality of Communication - Phase III 
1 = Bad 
2 = Poor 
3 = Fair 
4 = Good 
5 = Excellent 
n = 36 
mean = 3.88 
median = 4 
mode = 4 
stdev = 0.65 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Bad  - Poor  - Fair  - Good  - Excellent NR NA
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the FDA during 
PHASE III
 
Figure 5-13:  Rating - Quality of Communication – NDA 
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Figure 5-14:  Rating - Value of End of Phase II Meeting 
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In analyzing the amount interviewees were willing to pay, responses of “Other” with amounts 
that did not lie in the ranges that were available ($100K to $500K, $500K to $1MM, $1MM to 
$5MM, and > $5MM) were designated as a no response (NR).  Responses of $0 were similarly 
designated as NR as interviewees indicated they were not willing to pay additional fees but gave 
a response to the subsequent amount question.  Logically, if the interviewee is unwilling to pay 
additional monies, the quantification of amount is irrelevant. 
Figure 5-15:  Rating - Willingness to Pay for Assistance and Interaction in Phase II 
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mode = 5 
stdev = 1.26 
Of the respondents (n = 17) who indicated that they were willing to pay additional monies, 41% 
indicated they were willing to pay between $100K to $500K on a per drug basis for Phase II.  An 
additional 47% indicated they were willing to pay between $500K to $1MM.  For Phase III (n = 
16), 31% were willing to pay between $100K to $500K; another 31% were willing to pay $500K 
to $1MM.  In a few cases, respondents indicated their company would be willing to pay in 
excess of one million dollars per drug for increased Phase II or Phase III interaction with the 
FDA.  Figure 5-17 below gives a comparison of the amounts by phase. 
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Figure 5-16:  Rating - Willingness to Pay for Assistance and Interaction in Phase III 
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Would your company be willing to pay additional user fees to hire FDA staff to help with
clinical development reviews, discussion, and issues during the following phases?
PHASE III
 
1 = Very Unlikely 
2 = Not Likely 
3 = Ambivalent 
4 = Somewhat Likely 
5 = Very Likely 
n = 32 
mean = 4.14 
median = 5 
mode = 5 
stdev = 1.34 
Figure 5-17:  Rating – Additional Monies for FDA Interaction – Phase II and Phase III 
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How much would you be willing to pay for more communication with the FDA per phase?
 
Interviewees during qualitative discussion placed a premium on appropriate informal and formal 
communication with the FDA.  While interviewees believed that the quality of communication in 
Phase II and beyond was generally good, they believed additional communication and interaction 
was critical to reducing drug development times.  Consistent with the theme of variability, 
interviewees indicated that interactions and communication were highly variable from division to 
division.  One company provided an example where development was delayed by half a year.  In 
this particular case, the company was trying to move from Phase II to Phase III.  Due to 
extremely poor communication from the division, what usually took three to four months with 
other divisions, took over nine months. 
 
Although, interviewees gave high ratings to the current quality of communication with the FDA, 
the overwhelming response was for additional interaction and communication.  Indeed, 
interviewees indicated that their companies were willing to pay substantial sums of money on a 
per drug basis for additional communication.  Based on the quantitative survey analysis as 
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discussed above, the hypothesis, that “industry believes that communication with the FDA is 
inadequate during late stage clinical studies,” is substantiated. 
Section 5.07 FDA – “Custodian of the Knowledge Base” 
The FDA reviews all prescription drug applications in the United States.  While this is a 
completely obvious statement, the implications are significant.  De facto, the FDA has 
knowledge on all classes of compounds and the success or failures of these compounds.  This 
issue was not addressed in the quantitative questionnaire; however, over five interviewees raised 
this issue during qualitative discussion.  An interviewee appropriately termed the FDA the 
“Custodian of the Knowledge Base.”   
 
It is unclear how the vast knowledge accumulated at the FDA has been stored or managed.  
Given the recent developments in electronic submission of documents, it is likely that much 
information is paper based or resident with individuals at the FDA.   
 
Respondents indicated that sharing proprietary and confidential information would be rather 
complicated; however, interviewees indicated a willingness to give the FDA permission to 
divulge information on drug failures from within their company in exchange for access to 
information from other companies.   
 
Several interviewees indicated that the FDA often requests certain trials or data points without 
much explanation.  In fact, the FDA issues these seemingly obscure requests based on the 
agency’s experience with similar drugs from other sponsors; however, the agency is unable to 
discuss specifics or details due to confidentiality requirements and protections afforded to the 
sponsor companies.  In many cases, interviewees indicated that their company pushed back on 
the FDA’s demands due to the lack of explanation.  Greater information transparency and 
reduced information asymmetry in the form of an accessible “knowledge database” would 
potentially expedite these types of issues and increase the odds of success (or help stop likely 
failures).  Anecdotally, one interviewee pointed out that Phase I clinical trials on a structurally 
similar drug to that of a previously failed drug that caused toxicities was not in the interest of the 
public health, and indeed could be viewed as likely inflicting harm on patients. 
 
Reconciling the need for greater information on therapeutics with which the FDA has experience 
and the need to protect proprietary and competitive information will be challenging.  But, 
companies appear to be willing to discuss the issue.  In a recent white paper, the FDA recognizes 
that this is a significant opportunity to make drug development more efficient.33  To a more 
limited extent, CROs also have a pooled knowledge database. 
Section 5.08 Surrogate Markers 
Surrogate markers, often referred to as biomarkers, are often casually mentioned as being the 
panacea for drug development.  “If only we had a biomarker for X or a biomarker for Y” 
according to some faculty at Harvard Medical School, drug development would be much easier.  
 
33 United States Food and Drug Administration. “Innovation or Stagnation?  Challenge and Opportunity on the 
Critical Path to New Medical Products.”  US Food and Drug Administration, 2004. 
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Industry interviewees demonstrated similar enthusiasm for the concept although with much more 
guarded optimism.   
 
And rightly so, given the complexity of validating that a surrogate marker is indeed highly 
correlated with clinical benefit.  As described by Frank and Hargreaves, surrogate markers fail 
for five main reasons: 1) treatment effects are reflected in the biomarker but disease 
pathophysiology is unaffected; 2) biomarker reflects a change in pathophysiology but it is 
clinically irrelevant; 3) the biomarker reflects clinically relevant changes but does not reflect the 
treatment mechanism; 4) the biomarker reflects a clinically relevant change but other more 
relevant changes (toxicity) are not reflected in the marker; and 5) the biomarker may not reflect 
the “classical” clinical assessment due to patient population, novel mechanism, or novel 
indication. 34 Interviewees voiced many of the issues stated above.  Furthermore, participants 
indicated that without appropriate guidance from the FDA, use of surrogate markers for primary 
efficacy endpoints was just too risky. 
 
Given the difficulty in validating surrogate markers, the premise of appropriate economic 
motivation in the form of patent incentives was investigated quantitatively and qualitatively 
along with the willingness of companies to use surrogate markers as the primary endpoint in 
clinical trials.  Quantitatively, interviewees had a bimodal response to whether their company 
would be willing to use surrogate markers under current FDA guidelines (See Figure 5-18) with 
50% indicating they were “Somewhat Likely” or higher to use them versus 50% that were 
“Ambivalent” or lower.  In the cases where interviewees indicated they were very likely to use 
the surrogate marker, the interviewee stated that they were trying to validate the marker 
simultaneously with ongoing clinical trials or were following an approved FDA marker (e.g. 
CD4+ T-cell level for AIDS). 
 
When asked if their company would be motivated to use surrogate markers if patent 
opportunities were available on the marker, 62% indicated their company would be “Somewhat 
Likely” or higher (n =32, mean = 3.98, median = 5, mode = 5, stdev = 1.43).  Interestingly, 
responses were statistically different (p-value = 0.045) based on position within the company.  
As shown in Figure 5-19 below, executive vice presidents and more senior management believed 
their company would be less likely to use surrogate markers with patent incentives on the marker 
as compared to vice presidents and lower management.   
 
During qualitative discussion of surrogate markers, the more senior management indicated that 
patent incentives would be of significant interest, but not specifically on the marker.  Several 
interviewees stated that it would not be in the interest of the public health or the interest of the 
company to patent surrogate markers which would be used as tools in research; however, these 
respondents indicated that extension of patent life on a drug developed using a surrogate marker 
would be of significant interest.  In exchange for the additional patent life, the biomarker would 
be placed in the public domain and available for use by other drug developers. 
 
 
 
34 Frank, R., Hargreaves, R.  “Clinical Biomarkers in Drug Discovery and Development.”  Nature Reviews Drug 
Discovery.  2003:2;566-580. 
Figure 5-18:  Rating - Use of Surrogate Markers as Primary Endpoint 
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How likely is your company to use surrogate markers in clinical trials as the primary
endpoint under the current FDA guidelines?
 
1 = Very Unlikely 
2 = Not Likely 
3 = Ambivalent 
4 = Somewhat Likely 
5 = Very Likely 
n = 34 
mean = 3.26 
median = 3.5 
mode = 5 
stdev = 1.52 
Despite the positive quantitative responses, interviewees, during qualitative discussion of 
surrogate markers, indicated great hesitancy to rely on surrogate markers under current FDA 
regulations.  Many interviewees indicated that biomarkers were used extensively within the 
company to evaluate safety concerns or to assist in Go/No-Go decisions, but accepted clinical 
endpoints still trumped biomarkers in most development programs. 
Figure 5-19:  Rating - Patent Incentives for Surrogate Markers 
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Section 5.09 FDA Advisory Board Panel 
While the FDA advisory board panels are not involved in the clinical development component of 
drug development, they play a key role in the drug approval process.  Interviewees indicated that 
on average, they were “Ambivalent” about the value of the advisory board panel and process 
(See Figure 5-20).  Individuals who were proponents of the panel indicated that it was a critical 
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point in the NDA process that allowed the public and outside physicians to evaluate the drug, as 
well as witness the FDA at work. 
 
Detractors were critical of the advisory board process in no uncertain terms.  Several 
interviewees likened the process to such colorful descriptors as “circus” and “dog and pony 
show.”  However, behind the colorful rhetoric, interviewees indicated great concern over the 
confrontational nature of the hearings.  According to several companies that have had very 
successful approval hearings – and yet are sharply critical - the process is setup with the 
company on one side, the FDA on the opposing side, and the advisory board as the adjudicator.  
In some cases, interviewees indicated that FDA personnel were in complete agreement in favor 
of approval of the drug prior to the hearing and yet had to provide an opposing view during the 
proceedings. 
 
Interviewees indicated that substantial amounts of money and time are spent preparing for the 
“show.”  While respondents agreed that the public must have an opportunity to learn about the 
drug per Federal regulations, the current process does not do proper service to the sponsor 
company or to the FDA.  According to several interviewees who were high-level FDA personnel 
prior to joining industry, panel experts are often wholly unprepared for the review and “read the 
material on the plan ride to the FDA.”  Given that the review process takes many FDA personnel 
several months, it seems improbable that a panelist could gain sufficient understanding to make a 
truly educated decision in just a few hours. 
Figure 5-20: Rating - FDA Advisory Board Panel 
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4 = Valuable 
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How would you rate the FDA Advisory Board Panel during approval?
 
Interviewees voiced concern over the panel volunteers and indicated that the conflict of interest 
rules are excessively stringent, preventing more qualified experts to review the drugs.  In one 
anecdotal case, a panel expert, a pediatrician by training, was extremely concerned with pediatric 
issues, even though the drug was not intended for any pediatric use.   
 
From the perspective of several respondents, the FDA, after reviewing all the safety and efficacy 
data, is well qualified to make the decision whether to approve the NDA.  Given the 
controversial value of the advisory board panel, dialogue and discussion among the FDA, 
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industry, and academia should be pursued to develop a better forum for discussing the virtues 
and faults of new therapeutics.  For example, an NIH sponsored discussion with leading experts, 
even with company affiliations, could be convened to discuss the scientific merits of a variety of 
therapeutic agents.  Given the controversy that sometimes surround advisory panel meetings, the 
proposed NIH sponsored discussions would at a minimum convene a superset of experts 
Section 5.10 FDA Commissioner Vacancy 
In the PDUFA analysis in this research, it was not possible to draw any robust statistically 
significant conclusions from the FDA commissioner vacancy analysis.  On many occasions, the 
issue of an officially appointed FDA commissioner was discussed with interviewees.  The 
general perception from the interviewees was that for the broad range of drugs under review, the 
absence or presence of the FDA commissioner is immaterial.  However, for the few drugs that 
carry greater political and public baggage, the lack of a commissioner can make progress very 
challenging given the perceived unwillingness of FDA staff to make politically risky decisions.  
From an economic perspective, this can be viewed as the FDA commissioner having an effect on 
NDA review times on the marginal few drugs with major political or social repercussions. 
Section 5.11 A Few More Words on PDFUA 
The majority of companies agreed that PDUFA has been very successful in reducing NDA 
review times.  However, multiple respondents indicated concern over increasing approval times 
in the latter part of 2002 and 2003.  Over 50% of the interviewees gave examples of the FDA 
meeting the PDUFA action date with a complete response letter that had a list of questions.  In 
some cases the questions were only a few pages but in many cases they were quite extensive, in 
one case exceeding twenty pages.  Several interviewees suggested that PDUFA has created 
perverse incentives for certain FDA divisions not to communicate with sponsors for fear of 
missing the PDUFA date.  
 
While it is completely appropriate for the agency to request more information, companies 
believed that a vast majority of questions could have been answered in a short time frame during 
the NDA review process if the agency was able to review the file earlier during the review 
period.  Companies are under the impression that FDA reviewers are overburdened with 
additional material to review such as supplemental NDAs and clinical trial protocols for drugs 
under development.  As a result, FDA staff does not review NDA packages until shortly before 
PDUFA action dates.  This may or may not be the case, but it is important to recognize that very 
few drugs are actually approved on a PDUFA action date.  As a point of fact, twenty-one NME’s 
were approved in 2003, and according to interviewees none were approved on the PDUFA 
date.35
 
35 US Food and Drug Administration.  NMEs Approved in Calendar Year 2003. US Food and Drug Administration. 
[online] (cited 30 Apr 204) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/NMECY2003.HTM> (2004). 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
Section 6.01 Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the research study: 
• R&D and regulatory industry personnel have an overall good opinion of the FDA’s 
ability to regulate drug development. 
• Industry believes they are well organized to interact with the FDA but acknowledge that 
mergers and acquisitions within the industry have resulted in poorer interactions and 
communication with the FDA, at least in the short run. 
• Industry acknowledges that they sometimes run additional clinical trials that are not 
required for approval; however, these trials are used for internal decisions or for key label 
requirements that will hopefully allow the company to recoup its investment in the drug.  
• Surrogate markers are used extensively for internal decisions within companies but are 
not used extensively as primary endpoints in clinical trials due to the complexities of 
validating the markers. 
• Industry believes that the FDA advisory panel hearings are of variable value in the 
approval process. 
• Sponsor companies highly value current communication with the FDA but would like 
additional interactions during all phases of development and are willing to pay substantial 
amounts to facilitate these interactions. 
• PDUFA legislation reduced drug approval times and had a net positive financial impact 
relative to the direct PDUFA costs paid by companies. 
• Inconsistent communication and interactions between FDA therapeutic divisions and 
sponsors introduce additional volatility into the drug development process. 
• Industry believes that the quality, responsiveness, training, and direct leadership of the 
FDA medical reviewers are highly variable.  This leads to inconsistent application of 
FDA regulations and varied interpretation of scientific data. 
• Industry believes that high turnover among FDA medical reviewers and senior officials 
delay development times due to inefficient communication and understanding of 
previously accepted decisions. 
• The FDA, as the custodian of all drug information, has the ability to inform sponsors of 
potential safety issues or pitfalls with new drugs; however, due to legal obligations to 
sponsors, the FDA cannot disclose proprietary information to other drug developers. 
 
Based on the research, I would make the following recommendations, which are discussed in 
more detail below in Section 6.02 Improving Drug Development for the Future: 
• The FDA should strive to decrease the variability of communication practices among its 
therapeutic divisions by investigating best practices and developing appropriate standards 
that can be measured and tracked.  This will increase information transparency and 
reduce information asymmetry with industry, leading to more efficient drug development. 
• The FDA should establish an automatic dispute escalation and review for key substantive 
decisions made during formal FDA-Industry meetings that significantly impact the FDA 
or industry. 
60 
                                                
• The FDA should establish an official audit and review process that retrospectively 
analyzes best and worst practices in NDA approval and clinical development each year.  
The audit should be made publicly available with protections for proprietary information 
if necessary. 
• Industry and the FDA should develop a candid, mutual feedback mechanism to evaluate 
each other during key milestones of drug development. 
• The FDA, as the custodian of the drug knowledge database, should work with industry to 
provide important safety and efficacy information accrued from previous therapeutic 
studies.  Industry must be willing to help FDA change the confidentiality rules to ensure 
that the greater public good and safety is served. 
• The FDA should establish an “FDA University” where industry and FDA employees can 
develop greater expertise in the regulatory and review process.  A greater understanding 
of each other’s respective challenges will foster communication and collaboration. 
Section 6.02 Improving Drug Development for the Future 
The FDA is greatly respected for its role in protecting the public health and ensuring the safety 
and efficacy of therapeutic products.  While the industry does not agree with some aspects of 
how the agency functions, companies, on average, do believe that the agency does a good job 
given the resources at its disposal.  A comment by one interviewee, echoed by many of the 
respondents, is that “the onus of drug discovery and development falls primarily on industry.  
The FDA should facilitate, not hinder, the development of good therapeutics and protect the 
public from unsafe and ineffective drugs.”  Another interview commented, “There are significant 
costs to the U.S. public health in the lack of coordination between the FDA and industry.  
Protecting the U.S. health is achieved when bad drugs are kept off the market, but what about 
good drugs that are delayed unnecessarily?” 
 
As demonstrated in the PDUFA analysis in this thesis, creation of metrics with accountability to 
sponsors has significantly accelerated drug approval from averages exceeding thirty months in 
the 1980’s to roughly over one and a half years during PDUFA I and II.  The benefit to 
companies in terms of increase in profitability and innovative returns has been significant.  The 
PDUFA fees, while not insignificant amounts of money, have yielded definite returns for 
companies.  While concerns do exist regarding the current use of PDUFA fees and what appears 
to be slightly increasing approval times36, the legislation has been very successful.  Finally, 
PDUFA has increased the transparency and predictability of the NDA review process. 
 
The consistent theme stated by respondents throughout the quantitative and qualitative 
interviews was the high degree of variability in communication, interaction, and organization 
within the FDA.  The clinical development process can benefit from the precedence of PDUFA 
and the implementation of performance measurements that focused the agency on efficiency.  
The primary hypothesis in this thesis attempted to assess the premise that communication and 
interaction between the FDA and industry is inadequate.  This hypothesis is supported as 
assessed through the quantitative questionnaire.  While companies consider the current level of 
 
36 US Food and Drug Administration. Approval Times for Priority and Standard NDAs  Calendar Years 1993-2003.  
US Food and Drug Administration. [online] (cited 30 Apr 2004) <http://www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/NDAapps93-
03.htm> (2004). 
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communication to be on average “Good,” interviewees strongly indicated the desire for 
additional informal communication and were willing to pay substantial amounts of money for 
additional interactions with the FDA across all phases of development.   
 
Interviewees consistently stated that increased communication and interaction would 
substantially increase information transparency and reduce information asymmetry between the 
FDA and industry.  In turn, this would lead to an overall reduction in risk and increase in 
predictability.  However, these actions must be coupled with standard performance metrics and 
best practices across the therapeutic divisions in order to be effective.  Industry “wants as many 
interactions as possible” with the FDA to develop mutually respectful and collegial relationships. 
 
But, there will be a “constant balance between a company wanting to know what is going on and 
the agency’s need to safeguard its decision making process.”  The agency has been burned as in 
the case of ImClone where company management sold shares on insider information that the 
FDA was going to reject the company’s NDA.  The pressure from the investment community is 
substantial.  The FDA is rightly concerned with how much information to divulge to companies 
during the development and NDA process given the past negative experiences. 
 
In many cases, communication between the FDA and industry is imperfect.  When industry does 
not agree with a specific medical reviewer or staff member, industry attempts to resolve the issue 
through informal communication with the reviewer or their superior.  In some cases, critical 
issues, such as protocol agreements, are more difficult to resolve.  While the agency encourages 
the use of the Ombudsman’s office, no company or interviewee in the sample surveyed in this 
research has ever used the office.  Industry indicated that using the Ombudsman was not a viable 
method for dispute resolution.  Their reasoning was that regardless of the outcome via the 
Ombudsman, the reviewer would feel threatened.  This would damage the ongoing relationship 
for the current review, not to mention future reviews by the same individual or division.  A 
possible way to handle the more difficult disputes would be a mandatory review of controversial 
decisions or disputes via automatic escalation to an appropriately staffed review committee.  This 
would potentially eliminate any hard feelings that would be harbored by the reviewer and would 
ease the fears of industry.  However, this process would have to be carefully crafted to prevent 
unnecessary escalations that would exacerbate delays in development and increase burdens on 
FDA personnel. 
 
Interviewees expressed concern as to whether “the FDA [is] prepared for the new paradigm in 
molecular medicine.”  Given the greater emphasis on molecular biology and the conservation of 
basic molecular mechanisms across therapeutic areas, interviewees believe that the FDA, with 
the current strict divisional separation, is ill-prepared to handle complex combination products 
(e.g. Drug Eluting Stents) and NDAs with applications in several diseases (e.g. immune therapies 
that treat rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, and Crohn’s). 
 
In order to keep pace with the rapid changes in science and medicine, the FDA needs a more 
rigorous training and development program.  The industry consistently raised the issue of the 
variability of quality, training, and accountability among FDA medical reviewers.  Interviewees 
acknowledged that there are some very good training classes within the FDA but not enough.  
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An interviewee gave the novel suggestion of creating an “FDA University” which would grant 
degrees and/or certifications across the broad spectrum of activities in which reviewers and staff 
are involved.  A current best practice is the invitation of industry to present a lecture to the 
agency on the drug development process.  Furthermore, industry participation will ensure that 
FDA staff is cognizant of the great time and cost involved in drug development.  According to 
interviewees, many FDA staff are not well-informed regarding how much additional clinical 
trials and studies cost.  Often reviewers will request studies without understanding the difficulties 
of recruiting patients and the associated financial costs.  Inclusion of industry and academia in 
such a university would ensure a consistent level of training and education.  Additionally, 
enhancement and extension of relationships with the National Institute of Health (NIH) and 
academic institutions across the country will ensure that FDA staff has access to the latest 
research and experts. 
 
Industry has made significant use of information technology (IT) to assist in streamlining 
processes.  From the respondents’ perspective, the FDA has not exploited IT.  For example, more 
and more companies are using electronic data capture during clinical trials.  This provides real 
time monitoring.  In theory, the FDA could be provided access to the records and could better 
monitor any safety concerns.  PDUFA mandated specific response times from the agency and as 
a result the agency developed systems to monitor and track performance.  Similar IT systems can 
be developed to measure other aspects of communication and interaction with industry.  FDA 
staff could be rewarded with appropriate incentives for improving performance, perhaps via 
performance bonuses provided in the form of graduated fees from industry.  Implementation of 
additional IT systems also will enable the FDA to provide more accurate feedback and reporting 
to the industry, ensuring better and more frequent communication. 
 
During discussions with industry employees, we discovered that there is no true audit and review 
of the FDA with the exception of Congress.  Audit reviews, either independent or internal, that 
measure division performance and best practice implementation would provide the FDA with the 
means to evaluate itself.  Additionally, retrospective sampling of some portion of successful and 
unsuccessful applications would allow the agency to provide feedback to the industry and to its 
staff on best and worst practices.  In one case, a company initiated a meeting with FDA medical 
reviewers and team leads to receive feedback on their application process and NDA post 
approval.  Formal feedback from the agency on what activities industry should start, stop, and 
continue would help industry improve.  Likewise, feedback and involvement of industry on a 
regular basis would provide similar benefits to the agency. 
 
The cornerstone of the FDA is the protection of the public health.  The concern with Type I 
errors is understandable, but the public, FDA, and industry need to evaluate continually the 
appropriate level of risk that will be tolerated in our medical products.  Certainly, the FDA can 
reduce pre-market requirements and allow products to market sooner.  Academics and industry 
suggest earlier approval with the understanding that a drug will have restricted use for the first 
year or few years until appropriate safety data is accumulated in the market.  For example, a drug 
could theoretically be approved for prescription by certain centers or physicians.  Marketing of 
the product would be severely restricted.  In the case where safety parameters are exceeded, the 
FDA can exercise its power and withdraw approval.  It is important to bear in mind that 
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companies do not want product failures in the market place, for several reasons.  First, they are 
potentially exposed to legal recourse from consumers.  Second, their reputation within the 
market and among physicians will suffer.  The trend of increasing safety requirements will likely 
increase as science reveals additional ways to measure toxicities and effects.  However, 
designing very large studies to assess these issues in patient populations will become 
increasingly difficult as drug naïve patient segments dwindle.  Development of 
pharmacogenomics and patient enrichment studies will be critical in accommodating the 
increasing safety demands. 
 
“The FDA is like the IRS, you only hear from them when there are problems” and “No news is 
very bad news” are not the statements that one wants to hear from industry regarding the FDA.  
Rather the agency should strive for comments such as “the agency is a top-notch organization” 
with “lots of excellent talent and people.”  Indeed, industry as a whole has a high opinion of the 
FDA; however companies take issue with the interaction and communication breakdowns within 
the agency and between the agency and their company.  Clearly, industry is willing to have more 
interaction with the FDA and will put their money where their mouth is.  Improving the 
predictability of interactions with the FDA and ensuring appropriate mechanisms to track and 
measure performance, as evidenced by PDUFA, can help ensure that the agency moves smoothly 
into the 21st century of drug development.  Simultaneously, industry must and does appear to 
recognize that the burden of discovery and drug development falls squarely on their shoulders.  
The FDA can facilitate development, provide and receive feedback, and implement systems to 
reduce information asymmetry and confusion, but ultimately the pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies must prove that they have safe and effective products. 
Section 6.03 Study Enhancements and Limitations 
In retrospect, the quantitative questionnaire could have been enhanced to delve deeper into some 
of the key issues that were investigated.  More pointed questions would have been extremely 
valuable in elucidating distinctions when the interviewee did respond or gave a weighted average 
response.  For example, interviewees often responded with the answer “fair” or “variable” to the 
questions regarding medical reviewers.  Refinement of these questions to solicit feedback on a 
per division basis or with percentage estimates might have been more useful. 
 
The sample of companies interviewed during this research was not chosen at random from a 
listing of biotech, pharmaceutical, and CRO companies.  It was important for the purpose of the 
research to interview personnel at companies that had considerable experience with the FDA and 
drug development.  A random sampling of companies engaged in drug development would not 
have ensured coverage of companies with significant development experience.  While not 
proven, we believe that the sample is representative of the major stakeholders of drug 
development within industry.   
 
Virtually all the interviewees were engaged in R&D or regulatory activities.  General 
management and senior executives (e.g. chief executive officer, chief financial officer) were not 
interviewed.  Their opinions on interactions with the FDA might be very different given the 
greater pressure they face from the investment community and shareholders. 
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It is my intent in conjunction with Professor Ernst Berndt of MIT Sloan and Dr. Matthew 
Strobeck to interview a number of division directors at the FDA using a similar quantitative 
instrument to the one used with industry respondents.  A white paper document providing a 
comprehensive overview of all findings of this research is forthcoming during May or June of 
2004. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  PDUFA Data and Information 
Figure A-1:  Data Fields Provided in NME List37
Field Name Field Description Coded Values
NME Name Generic Name of the NME with any Withdrawal 
Information
Des Descriptive Characteristics of Drug N = NDA; B = Biologic; 
V = Vaccine; D = Diagnostic; R = 
Radiopharmaceutical; 
O = Orphan drug; 
T = Therapeutic (nuclear related 
products)
Dev Co Developing Company
DC Developing Country
USA App FDA Approval Date
TS Therapeutic Significance Rating A, B, C - Pre-PDUFA; 
P = Priority; S = Standard
1st MKT Year of 1st World Marketing
1st YR County of 1st World Marketing
USA Trade US Trade Name at the time of approval
IND Sub IND Submission Date
NDA Clock NDA/BLA Clock Date
IND # IND Number
App Mo Elapsed Approval Time in Months
IND Yrs Years in the IND Phase (IND through NDA/BLA 
submission)
Dev Yrs Total development years (IND through NDA/BLA 
approval)
NDA # NDA/BLA Number
Sponsor Name of the Sponsoring Company
USDev? US/Foreign Developer Code US = USA; F = Foreign; 
UN = unknown
Orp? Orphan Drug Code O = Orphan; N = Non-orphan
MK_DT US Marketing Date (Year and Month)  
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37 Compliments of Ed Hass, Office of Policy and Planning, Food and Drug Administration 
Figure A-2:  Major Therapeutic Code 
Description Major Class Code
ANESTHESIA 604
ANTIBIOTICS/SYSTEMIC 401
ANTIBIOTICS/SYSTEMIC 701
ANTI-HYPERTENSIVES/RENAL 102
ANTI-INFECTIVES/SYSTEMIC 403
ANTI-INFECTIVES/SYSTEMIC 703
ANTI-INFLAMMATORY 503
BIOLOGIC B
CARDIAC DRUGS 101
CARDIAC DRUGS 801
DENTAL 603
DERMATOLOGICS 402
DRUG ABUSE 203
FERTILITY/ANTIFERTILITY 301
GASTRO-INTESTINAL 803
IMMUNOSTIMULATORY AGENTS 702
METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE I 302
METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE II 303
METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE III 304
NEUROLOGY 201
NO THERAPEUTIC CLASS ENTERED 0
ONCOLOGY 501
OPHTHALMICS 404
PSYCHO-PHARMACOLOGY 202
RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS 502
RENAL 605
RESPIRATORY 601
SURGICAL 602
TROPICAL 405
VAGINAL AND RELATED PRODUCTS 406  
 
Figure A-3:  Super Major Therapeutic Code 
Super Major Category (SMC) Code Description
1 Cardiovascular
2 Anti-Infectives
3 Neoplastic
4 CNS
5 Other
6 AIDS
7 Reproduction
8 Biologic
9 [Reserved for future use]
10 None  
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Figure A-4:  Cross-reference of Super Major Therapeutic Code to Major Therapeutic Code 
Major Class Code Description SMC Code
0 NO THERAPEUTIC CLASS ENTERED 10
101 CARDIAC DRUGS 1
102 ANTI-HYPERTENSIVES/RENAL 1
201 NEUROLOGY 4
202 PSYCHO-PHARMACOLOGY 4
203 DRUG ABUSE 4
301 FERTILITY/ANTIFERTILITY 5
302 METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE I 5
303 METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE II 5
304 METABOLIC/ENDOCRINE III 5
401 ANTIBIOTICS/SYSTEMIC 2
402 DERMATOLOGICS 5
403 ANTI-INFECTIVES/SYSTEMIC 2
404 OPHTHALMICS 5
405 TROPICAL 2
406 VAGINAL AND RELATED PRODUCTS 5
501 ONCOLOGY 3
502 RADIOPHARMACEUTICALS 5
503 ANTI-INFLAMMATORY 5
601 RESPIRATORY 5
602 SURGICAL 5
603 DENTAL 5
604 ANESTHESIA 5
605 RENAL 5
701 ANTIBIOTICS/SYSTEMIC 2
702 IMMUNOSTIMULATORY AGENTS 2
703 ANTI-INFECTIVES/SYSTEMIC 2
801 CARDIAC DRUGS 1
803 GASTRO-INTESTINAL 5
A70 AIDS DRUGS 6
B BIOLOGIC 8  
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Figure A-5:  GDP Deflation Table38
1990 0.8125
1991 0.8430
1992 0.8642
1993 0.8838
1994 0.9028
1995 0.9218
1996 0.9395
1997 0.9559
1998 0.9675
1999 0.9802
2000 1.0000
2001 1.0234
2002 1.0415
2003 1.0585
2004 1.0724
Year GDP (Chained) Price Index
 
 
Figure A-6:  Published FDA PDUFA Fees for 1993 to 2004 
APPLICATIONS APPLICATIONS SUPPLEMENTS ESTABLISHMENT PRODUCT 
Year WITH WITH  NO WITH FEE FEE
CLINICAL CLINICAL CLINICAL
DATA DATA DATA
1993 $100,000 $50,000 $50,000 $60,000 $6,000
1994 $162,000 $81,000 $81,000 $93,800 $9,400
1995 $208,000 $104,000 $104,000 $129,000 $12,200
1996 $204,000 $102,000 $102,000 $135,300 $12,600
1997 $205,000 $102,500 $102,500 $115,700 $13,200
1998 $256,846 $128,423 $128,423 $141,966 $18,591
1999 $272,282 $136,141 $136,141 $128,435 $18,364
2000 $285,740 $142,870 $142,870 $141,971 $19,959
2001 $309,647 $154,823 $154,823 $145,989 $21,892
2002 $313,320 $156,660 $156,660 $140,109 $21,630
2003 $533,400 $266,700 $266,700 $209,900 $32,400
2004 $573,500 $286,750 $286,750 $226,800 $36,080  
                                                 
38 Reference GDP Deflator Tables 
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Figure A-7:  GDP Deflated PDUFA Fees - Forecast to 2017 
APPLICATIONS APPLICATIONS SUPPLEMENTS ESTABLISHMENT PRODUCT 
GDP Year WITH WITH  NO WITH FEE FEE
Deflator CLINICAL Growth CLINICAL Growth CLINICAL Growth Growth Growth
DATA Rate DATA Rate DATA Rate Rate Rate
0.864 1992 $97,782 $48,891 $48,891 $58,669 $5,867
0.884 1993 $97,782 $48,891 $48,891 $58,669 $5,867
0.903 1994 $155,074 59% $77,537 59% $77,537 59% $89,789 53% $8,998 53%
0.922 1995 $195,003 26% $97,501 26% $97,501 26% $120,939 35% $11,438 27%
0.940 1996 $187,650 -4% $93,825 -4% $93,825 -4% $124,456 3% $11,590 1%
0.956 1997 $185,334 -1% $92,667 -1% $92,667 -1% $104,601 -16% $11,934 3%
0.968 1998 $229,423 24% $114,711 24% $114,711 24% $126,808 21% $16,606 39%
0.980 1999 $240,059 5% $120,030 5% $120,030 5% $113,236 -11% $16,191 -3%
1.000 2000 $246,937 3% $123,468 3% $123,468 3% $122,691 8% $17,249 7%
1.023 2001 $261,478 6% $130,739 6% $130,739 6% $123,279 0% $18,486 7%
1.042 2002 $259,982 -1% $129,991 -1% $129,991 -1% $116,258 -6% $17,948 -3%
1.059 2003 $435,488 68% $217,744 68% $217,744 68% $171,370 47% $26,453 47%
1.072 2004 $462,158 6% $231,079 6% $231,079 6% $182,768 7% $29,075 10%
N/A 2005 485,266$           5% 242,633$            5% 242,633$            5% 191,907$               5% 30,529$     5%
N/A 2006 509,530$           5% 254,765$            5% 254,765$            5% 201,502$               5% 32,056$     5%
N/A 2007 535,006$           5% 267,503$           5% 267,503$           5% 211,577$              5% 33,658$    5%
N/A 2008 909,510$           70% 454,755$            70% 454,755$            70% 359,681$               70% 57,219$     70%
N/A 2009 1,000,462$        10% 500,231$            10% 500,231$            10% 395,649$               10% 62,941$     10%
N/A 2010 1,050,485$        5% 525,242$            5% 525,242$            5% 415,431$               5% 66,088$     5%
N/A 2011 1,103,009$        5% 551,504$            5% 551,504$            5% 436,203$               5% 69,392$     5%
N/A 2012 1,158,159$        5% 579,080$           5% 579,080$           5% 458,013$              5% 72,862$    5%
N/A 2013 1,968,871$        70% 984,435$            70% 984,435$            70% 778,622$               70% 123,865$   70%
N/A 2014 2,165,758$        10% 1,082,879$         10% 1,082,879$         10% 856,485$               10% 136,252$   10%
N/A 2015 2,274,046$        5% 1,137,023$         5% 1,137,023$         5% 899,309$               5% 143,065$   5%
N/A 2016 2,387,748$        5% 1,193,874$         5% 1,193,874$         5% 944,274$               5% 150,218$   5%
N/A 2017 2,507,135$        5% 1,253,568$        5% 1,253,568$        5% 991,488$              5% 157,729$  5%  
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Appendix B:  Interview Questionnaires 
Figure B-1:  Official COUHES Approval 
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Figure B-2:  Quantitative Questionnaire Page 
1 2 3 4 5
Bad Poor Fair Good Excellent N/R Question
F F F F F F
What is your overall perception of the FDA in regards to 
regulating drug development and appropriately weighing the 
risk/benefits of new drugs? 
F F F F F F How would you rate the FDA's effectiveness of keeping unsafe drugs from the market?
F F F F F F Please rate how well your company is organized to interact with the FDA?
F F F F F F
Please rate the progress your company has made in reducing 
clinical development times on issues that your company can 
control.
F F F F F F How would you rate your company's experience with Contract Research Organizations? 
Please rate the quality of communication your company has 
with the FDA during the following phases
F F F F F F Pre-Clinical
F F F F F F Phase I
F F F F F F Phase II
F F F F F F Phase III
F F F F F F NDA
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers.
F F F F F F The quality of FDA reviewers is:
F F F F F F Accountability of FDA reviewers is:
F F F F F F Training for FDA reviewers is:
F F F F F F Direct Leadership of FDA reviewers is:
F F F F F F The clinical protocols my company submits to the FDA are on average:
F F F F F F When responding to FDA inquiries or questions, your company responds effectively and efficiently.
1 2 3 4 5
Very Unlikely Not Likely Ambivalent Somewhat L. Very Likely N/R Question
Would your company be willing to pay additional user fees to 
hire FDA staff to help with clinical development reviews, 
discussion, and issues during the following phases?
F F F F F F Phase I
F F F F F F Phase II
F F F F F F Phase III
How much would you be willing to pay for more 
communication with the FDA per phase?
100-500K 500k-1M 1M-5M >5M Other Phase I
100-500K 500k-1M 1M-5M >5M Other Phase II
100-500K 500k-1M 1M-5M >5M Other Phase III
F F F F F F
How likely is your company to use surrogate markers in 
clinical trials as the primary endpoint under the current FDA 
guidelines?
F F F F F F
How likely is your company to use surrogate markers if patent 
opportunities and incentives were available on the surrogate 
marker?  
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1 2 3 4 5
Useless Not Valuable Ambivalent Valuable Very Valuable N/R Question
F F F F F F How valuable is the consultation with the FDA at the end of Phase II - beginning of Phase III?
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication 
would be with the FDA during the following phases.
F F F F F F Pre-Clinical/IND
F F F F F F Phase I
F F F F F F Phase II
F F F F F F Phase III
F F F F F F NDA
How valuable has information gathering technology (e.g. 
proteomics, genomics, imaging - MRI, CT, etc.) been in 
helping reduce clinical development times in the following 
phases?
F F F F F F Pre-Clinical/IND
F F F F F F Phase I
F F F F F F Phase II
F F F F F F Phase III
F F F F F F NDA
F F F F F F How useful has electronic submission been to your company in the clinical development process?
F F F F F F How would you rate the FDA Advisory Board Panel during approval?
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Dis. Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree N/R Question
F F F F F F
In interacting with the FDA, my company's regulatory group is 
afraid to push back on many protocols or requirments 
demanded by the agency? 
F F F F F F
In interacting with the FDA, my company runs trials that are 
not often required by the FDA, but in anticipation of some 
future question they may ask.
F F F F F F In interacting with the FDA, my company runs additional tests in pre-clinical that are not required by the FDA.
F F F F F F Your company strongly takes into consideration FDA feedback on clinical protocols.
F F F F F F
When your company ignores FDA advice on clinical 
protocols, drug development costs and times are increased.
F F F F F F The EMEA is more efficient than the FDA in approving drugs?
F F F F F F Biologics fail in Phase III more often that small molecules fail in phase III
F F F F F F The FDA has made significant efforts to reduce clinical development times
F F F F F F The FDA has made significant efforts to reduce approval times  
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Figure B-3:  FDA Letter Endorsing Research 
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Appendix C:  PDUFA Analysis Additional Results 
Figure C-1:  Descriptive Statistics for All Approved NMEs (10/01/1979 - 09/30/2002) 
Mean 23.58 Mean 33.09 Mean 27.79 Mean 18.34 Mean 14.63
Standard Error 0.69 Standard Error 1.64 Standard Error 1.53 Standard Error 0.85 Standard Error 0.81
Median 19.19 Median 26.68 Median 23.49 Median 14.97 Median 11.93
Mode 11.99 Mode 19.32 Mode 29.90 Mode 11.99 Mode 5.95
Standard Deviation 17.67 Standard Deviation 21.26 Standard Deviation 18.94 Standard Deviation 11.62 Standard Deviation 9.59
Sample Variance 312.19 Sample Variance 452.20 Sample Variance 358.61 Sample Variance 134.91 Sample Variance 91.98
Kurtosis 6.08 Kurtosis 4.59 Kurtosis 2.80 Kurtosis 2.77 Kurtosis 1.72
Skewness 2.03 Skewness 1.83 Skewness 1.58 Skewness 1.46 Skewness 1.33
Range 132.11 Range 127.38 Range 97.45 Range 70.87 Range 48.46
Minimum 0.59 Minimum 5.32 Minimum 2.86 Minimum 0.59 Minimum 1.51
Maximum 132.70 Maximum 132.70 Maximum 100.30 Maximum 71.46 Maximum 49.97
Sum 15306.61 Sum 5558.67 Sum 4251.43 Sum 3447.82 Sum 2048.69
Count 649 Count 168 Count 153 Count 188 Count 140
All Drugs
(PDUFA II)
All Drugs
(1979-2002)
All Drugs
(1979-1986)
All Drugs
(1986-1992)
All Drugs
(PDUFA I)
 
Figure C-2:  Descriptive Statistics for Cardio Approved NMEs (10/01/1979 -09/30/2002) 
Mean 27.70 Mean 36.11 Mean 30.28 Mean 21.61 Mean 16.80
Standard Error 1.55 Standard Error 2.81 Standard Error 3.49 Standard Error 1.95 Standard Error 2.40
Median 23.72 Median 33.38 Median 26.97 Median 18.23 Median 13.63
Mode 23.72 Mode #N/A Mode 17.28 Mode 13.14 Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 16.48 Standard Deviation 17.12 Standard Deviation 18.11 Standard Deviation 11.06 Standard Deviation 9.91
Sample Variance 271.75 Sample Variance 292.96 Sample Variance 328.06 Sample Variance 122.24 Sample Variance 98.19
Kurtosis 4.69 Kurtosis 3.04 Kurtosis 8.01 Kurtosis 1.08 Kurtosis 0.68
Skewness 1.72 Skewness 1.42 Skewness 2.36 Skewness 1.19 Skewness 1.17
Range 94.39 Range 82.92 Range 90.87 Range 46.52 Range 33.54
Minimum 5.91 Minimum 13.08 Minimum 9.43 Minimum 6.67 Minimum 5.91
Maximum 100.30 Maximum 96.00 Maximum 100.30 Maximum 53.19 Maximum 39.46
Sum 3130.58 Sum 1335.89 Sum 817.54 Sum 691.55 Sum 285.60
Count 113 Count 37 Count 27 Count 32 Count 17
Cardiovascular Drugs 
(PDUFA II)
Cardiovascular Drugs 
(1979-2002)
Cardiovascular Drugs 
(1979-1986)
Cardiovascular Drugs 
(1986-1992)
Cardiovascular Drugs 
(PDUFA I)
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Figure C-3:  Descriptive Statistics for CNS Approved NMEs (10/01/1979 - 09/30/2002) 
Mean 26.22 Mean 41.53 Mean 30.37 Mean 18.09 Mean 20.21
Standard Error 2.14 Standard Error 6.23 Standard Error 3.05 Standard Error 2.10 Standard Error 3.24
Median 21.01 Median 39.56 Median 32.10 Median 14.88 Median 16.79
Mode 11.96 Mode #N/A Mode #N/A Mode 11.96 Mode #N/A
Standard Deviation 17.43 Standard Deviation 24.13 Standard Deviation 11.01 Standard Deviation 10.68 Standard Deviation 11.22
Sample Variance 303.63 Sample Variance 582.07 Sample Variance 121.20 Sample Variance 114.17 Sample Variance 125.93
Kurtosis 2.03 Kurtosis -0.99 Kurtosis 0.44 Kurtosis 1.08 Kurtosis 4.28
Skewness 1.40 Skewness 0.48 Skewness -0.56 Skewness 1.07 Skewness 2.01
Range 83.65 Range 73.66 Range 40.08 Range 46.09 Range 40.05
Minimum 0.59 Minimum 10.58 Minimum 6.44 Minimum 0.59 Minimum 9.92
Maximum 84.24 Maximum 84.24 Maximum 46.52 Maximum 46.69 Maximum 49.97
Sum 1730.56 Sum 622.95 Sum 394.84 Sum 470.28 Sum 242.50
Count 66 Count 15 Count 13 Count 26 Count 12
CNS Drugs
(1979-2002)
CNS Drugs
(1979-1986)
CNS Drugs
(1986-1992)
CNS Drugs
(PDUFA I)
CNS Drugs
(PDUFA II)
 
Figure C-4:  Pooled Regression with All NDAs (10/01/1979 - 09/30/2002)  
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.6215
R Square 0.3862
Adjusted R Square 0.3736
Standard Error 0.5754
Observations 649
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 13 132.277 10.175 30.734351 5.77706E-59
Residual 635 210.228 0.331
Total 648 342.504
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
INTERCEPT 3.4047 0.1273 26.7429 0.000 3.1547 3.6547 3.1547 3.6547
LNINDNDAMONTHS 0.0247 0.0239 1.0338 0.302 -0.0222 0.0715 -0.0222 0.0715
TIMETREND -0.0154 0.0087 -1.7605 0.079 -0.0325 0.0018 -0.0325 0.0018
PRIORITY -0.4955 0.0562 -8.8097 < 0.001 -0.6059 -0.3850 -0.6059 -0.3850
TREND_PDUFA1 -0.0180 0.0056 -3.1830 0.002 -0.0291 -0.0069 -0.0291 -0.0069
TREND_PDUFA2 -0.0198 0.0061 -3.2262 0.001 -0.0319 -0.0078 -0.0319 -0.0078
ORPHAN 0.0945 0.0647 1.4609 0.145 -0.0325 0.2216 -0.0325 0.2216
NATION -0.0495 0.0452 -1.0948 0.274 -0.1383 0.0393 -0.1383 0.0393
DRG_CARDIO 0.1131 0.0665 1.7004 0.090 -0.0175 0.2437 -0.0175 0.2437
DRG_ANTIINFECT -0.2833 0.0707 -4.0067 < 0.001 -0.4222 -0.1445 -0.4222 -0.1445
DRG_NEOPLASTIC -0.2608 0.1002 -2.6020 0.009 -0.4576 -0.0640 -0.4576 -0.0640
DRG_CNS 0.0655 0.0808 0.8108 0.418 -0.0932 0.2242 -0.0932 0.2242
DRG_BIO 0.0336 0.0764 0.4400 0.660 -0.1164 0.1836 -0.1164 0.1836
DRG_AIDS -0.8568 0.1686 -5.0823 < 0.001 -1.1878 -0.5257 -1.1878 -0.5257  
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Figure C-5:  Sensitivity to Real Discount Rate of NPVs for CNS and Cardiovascular 
Real Discount 
Rate NPV ($B)
PV PDUFA 
Sales ($ B)
PV Counterfactual 
Sales ($ B) Benefit ($ B) PV Fee ($ B)
Fee % of 
Benefit
0.5% 0.48$      184.12$          183.47$                    0.65$              0.17$             25.8%
1.0% 1.04$      170.03$          168.84$                    1.19$              0.15$             13.0%
1.5% 1.50$      157.15$          155.51$                    1.64$              0.14$             8.7%
2.0% 1.88$      145.37$          143.36$                    2.02$              0.13$             6.6%
2.5% 2.20$      134.59$          132.27$                    2.32$              0.12$             5.3%
3.0% 2.45$      124.70$          122.14$                    2.57$              0.11$             4.4%
3.5% 2.66$      115.64$          112.87$                    2.76$              0.11$             3.8%
4.0% 2.82$      107.32$          104.40$                    2.92$              0.10$             3.3%
4.5% 2.94$      99.68$            96.64$                      3.03$              0.09$             3.0%
5.0% 3.03$      92.65$            89.54$                      3.12$              0.08$             2.7%
5.5% 3.09$      86.19$            83.01$                      3.17$              0.08$             2.5%
6.0% 3.13$      80.23$            77.03$                      3.21$              0.07$             2.3%
6.5% 3.15$      74.75$            71.53$                      3.22$              0.07$             2.1%
7.0% 3.15$      69.69$            66.48$                      3.22$              0.06$             2.0%
7.5% 3.14$      65.03$            61.83$                      3.20$              0.06$             1.9%
8.0% 3.11$      60.72$            57.54$                      3.17$              0.06$             1.8%
8.5% 3.08$      56.73$            53.60$                      3.13$              0.05$             1.7%
9.0% 3.04$      53.05$            49.96$                      3.09$              0.05$             1.6%
9.5% 2.99$      49.64$            46.60$                      3.03$              0.05$             1.5%
10.0% 2.93$      46.48$            43.50$                      2.98$              0.04$             1.5%
Real Discount 
Rate NPV ($B)
PV PDUFA 
Sales ($ B)
PV Counterfactual 
Sales ($ B) Benefit ($ B) Fee ($ B)
Fee % of 
Benefit
0.5% 0.36$      161.38$          160.83$                    0.54$              0.19$             34.7%
1.0% 0.83$      149.63$          148.63$                    1.00$              0.17$             17.3%
1.5% 1.23$      138.85$          137.46$                    1.39$              0.16$             11.6%
2.0% 1.56$      128.94$          127.23$                    1.71$              0.15$             8.7%
2.5% 1.84$      119.84$          117.86$                    1.98$              0.14$             7.0%
3.0% 2.07$      111.47$          109.27$                    2.20$              0.13$             5.8%
3.5% 2.26$      103.76$          101.38$                    2.38$              0.12$             5.0%
4.0% 2.41$      96.65$            94.13$                      2.52$              0.11$             4.4%
4.5% 2.53$      90.10$            87.48$                      2.63$              0.10$             3.9%
5.0% 2.62$      84.06$            81.35$                      2.71$              0.10$             3.5%
5.5% 2.68$      78.48$            75.71$                      2.77$              0.09$             3.2%
6.0% 2.73$      73.33$            70.51$                      2.81$              0.08$             2.9%
6.5% 2.76$      68.56$            65.72$                      2.84$              0.08$             2.7%
7.0% 2.77$      64.15$            61.30$                      2.84$              0.07$             2.5%
7.5% 2.77$      60.06$            57.22$                      2.84$              0.07$             2.4%
8.0% 2.76$      56.28$            53.45$                      2.82$              0.06$             2.2%
8.5% 2.74$      52.76$            49.96$                      2.80$              0.06$             2.1%
9.0% 2.71$      49.51$            46.74$                      2.77$              0.06$             2.0%
9.5% 2.68$      46.48$            43.75$                      2.73$              0.05$             1.9%
10.0% 2.64$      43.67$            40.98$                      2.69$              0.05$             1.8%
CNS
Cardiovascular
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Appendix D:  Quantitative Survey Results 
Figure D-1:  Descriptive Statistics of Quantitative Survey 
1 = BAD / 2 = POOR / 3 = FAIR / 4 = GOOD / 5 = EXCELLENT n = Mean Median Mode Std. Dev NR NA
Biotech vs. 
Pharma (p-value 
for t-test)
EVP Up  vs. VP 
Down (p-value for t-
test)
What is your overall perception of the FDA in regards to regulating 
drug development and appropriately weighing the risk/benefits of new 
drugs? 
36 3.57 4 4 0.66 0 0 0.248 0.561
How would you rate the FDA's effectiveness of keeping unsafe drugs 
from the market?
36 4.07 4 4 0.60 0 0 0.233 0.827
Please rate how well your company is organized to interact with the 
FDA?
35 4.07 4 4 0.84 1 0 0.082 0.724
Please rate the progress your company has made in reducing clinical 
development times on issues that your company can control.
33 3.67 4 3 0.78 3 0 0.272 0.868
How would you rate your company's experience with Contract 
Research Organizations? 
31 3.39 3 3 0.80 5 0 0.313 0.287
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the 
FDA during the following phases PRE-CLINICAL
32 3.23 3 3 0.81 4 0 > 0.000 0.737
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the 
FDA during the following phases PHASE I
34 3.35 3 3 0.77 2 0 0.053 0.773
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the 
FDA during the following phases PHASE II
36 3.43 3.5 4 0.67 0 0 0.549 0.836
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the 
FDA during the following phases PHASE III
36 3.88 4 4 0.65 0 0 0.136 0.407
Please rate the quality of communication your company has with the 
FDA during the following phases NDA
35 3.76 4 4 0.96 1 0 0.561 0.722
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers. The quality 
of FDA reviewers is:
32 3.33 3 3 0.70 4 0 0.481 0.959
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers. 
Accountability of FDA reviewers is:
33 3.06 3 3 0.76 3 0 0.411 0.777
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers. Training 
for FDA reviewers is:
22 2.86 3 3 0.82 14 0 0.515 0.279
Please rate the following in regards to the FDA reviewers. Direct 
Leadership of FDA reviewers is:
32 3.45 3.5 4 0.65 4 0 0.292 0.589
The clinical protocols my company submits to the FDA are on 
average:
25 4.24 4 4 0.52 2 9 0.626 0.894
When responding to FDA inquiries or questions, your company 
responds effectively and efficiently.
27 4.20 4 4 0.71 0 9 0.265 0.253
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 1 = VERY LIKELY / 2 = NOT LIKELY / 3 = AMBIVALENT /
 4 = SOMEWHAT LIKELY / 5 = VERY LIKELY n = Mean Median Mode Std. Dev NR NA
Biotech vs. 
Pharma (p-value 
for t-test)
EVP Up  vs. VP 
Down (p-value for t-
test)
Would your company be willing to pay additional user fees to hire 
FDA staff to help with clinical development reviews, discussion, and 
issues during the following phases? PHASE I
33 3.86 4 5 1.26 3 0 0.600 0.888
Would your company be willing to pay additional user fees to hire 
FDA staff to help with clinical development reviews, discussion, and 
issues during the following phases? PHASE II
33 4.05 4 5 1.26 3 0 0.529 0.880
Would your company be willing to pay additional user fees to hire 
FDA staff to help with clinical development reviews, discussion, and 
issues during the following phases? PHASE III
32 4.14 5 5 1.34 4 0 0.807 0.645
How much would you be willing to pay for more communication with 
the FDA per phase? PHASE I
17 1.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 10 9 0.761 0.607
How much would you be willing to pay for more communication with 
the FDA per phase? PHASE II
17 1.82 2.00 2.00 2.00 10 9 0.622 0.693
How much would you be willing to pay for more communication with 
the FDA per phase? PHASE III
16 2.19 2.00 1.00 1.00 11 9 0.106 0.345
How likely is your company to use surrogate markers in clinical trials 
as the primary endpoint under the current FDA guidelines?
34 3.26 3.5 5 1.52 2 0 0.338 0.149
How likely is your company to use surrogate markers if patent 
opportunities and incentives were available on the surrogate marker?
32 3.98 5 5 1.43 4 0 0.690 0.045
 
 
** Note that the responses for the questions related to how much industry would be willing to pay for more interaction were scaled so that responses of “Other – 
5 ” were rated as NR in order to prevent the actual dollar estimates from being skewed by the scale.  Thus, this scale is set from one to four with one being $100K 
to $500K, two being $500k to $1MM, three being $1MM to $5MM, and four being greater than $5MM. 
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1 = USELESS / 2 = NOT VALUABLE / 3 = AMBIVALENT / 
4 = VALUABLE / 5 = VERY VALUABLE n = Mean Median Mode Std. Dev NR NA
Biotech vs. 
Pharma (p-value 
for t-test)
EVP Up  vs. VP 
Down (p-value for t-
test)
How valuable is the consultation with the FDA at the end of Phase II - 
beginning of Phase III?
34 4.71 5 5 0.52 2 0 0.895 0.745
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would 
be with the FDA during the following phases. PRE-CLINICAL/IND
33 4.42 5 5 0.79 3 0 0.529 0.971
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would 
be with the FDA during the following phases. PHASE I
35 4.11 4 5 0.90 1 0 0.331 0.542
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would 
be with the FDA during the following phases. PHASE II
35 4.50 5 5 0.53 1 0 0.800 1.000
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would 
be with the FDA during the following phases. PHASE III
34 4.71 5 5 0.52 2 0 0.195 0.864
Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would 
be with the FDA during the following phases. NDA
35 4.74 5 5 0.51 1 0 0.596 0.402
How valuable has information gathering technology been in helping 
reduce clinical development times in the following phases? PRE-
CLINICAL/IND
33 3.30 3 3 0.95 3 0 0.516 0.497
How valuable has information gathering technology been in helping 
reduce clinical development times in the following phases? PHASE I
31 3.27 3 3 0.95 5 0 0.552 0.098
How valuable has information gathering technology been in helping 
reduce clinical development times in the following phases? PHASE II
31 3.35 3 3 0.98 5 0 0.790 0.182
How valuable has information gathering technology been in helping 
reduce clinical development times in the following phases? PHASE III
30 3.35 3 3 1.11 6 0 0.212 0.207
How valuable has information gathering technology been in helping 
reduce clinical development times in the following phases? NDA
30 3.28 3 2 1.22 6 0 0.150 0.300
How useful has electronic submission been to your company in the 
clinical development process?
34 3.99 4 5 1.08 2 0 0.096 0.832
How would you rate the FDA Advisory Board Panel during approval? 34 3.25 3 3 0.94 2 0 0.973 0.485
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1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE  / 2 = DISAGREE / 3 = NEUTRAL / 
4 = AGREE / 5 = STRONGLY AGREE n = Mean Median Mode Std. Dev NR NA
In interacting with the FDA, my company's regulatory group is afraid 
to push back on many protocols or requirments demanded by the 
agency? 
36 3.00 2 2 1.45 0 0 0.095 0.614
In interacting with the FDA, my company runs trials that are not often 
required by the FDA, but in anticipation of some future question they 
may ask.
36 3.13 3 2 1.35 0 0 0.006 0.291
In interacting with the FDA, my company runs additional tests in pre-
clinical that are not required by the FDA.
34 3.38 4 2 1.26 2 0 0.227 0.321
Your company strongly takes into consideration FDA feedback on 
clinical protocols.
25 4.68 5 5 0.48 2 9 0.906 0.438
When your company ignores FDA advice on clinical protocols, drug 
development costs and times are increased.
23 4.04 4.5 5 1.16 4 9 0.913 0.414
The EMEA is more efficient than the FDA in approving drugs? 34 2.15 2 1 1.10 2 0 0.128 0.436
Biologics fail in Phase III more often that small molecules fail in 
phase III
24 2.54 2 2 1.14 12 0 0.050 0.905
The FDA has made significant efforts to reduce clinical development 
times
34 2.12 2 2 0.91 2 0 0.471 0.594
The FDA has made significant efforts to reduce approval times 34 3.53 4 4 0.99 2 0 0.870 0.057  
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Figure D-2:  Rating - Additional Informal Communication Value - Phase II, III, and NDA 
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Please rate how valuable additional informal communication would be with the FDA during
the following phases. PHASE II
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